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OUTING OUTSIDE GROUP SPENDING ON ELECTIONS
Have the judicial decisions of the past two decades made it impossible to rein in the
unregulated and often undisclosed political spending that has inundated recent elections? This
article argues that even without a constitutional amendment, judicial reversals of the holdings of
Citizens United1 and SpeechNow.org,2 or legislative action, there is much that can be done to
reform campaign finance practices by enforcing laws already on the books. It details how those
laws, if enforced, would ameliorate the worst excesses of current practices, and it elaborates and
counters the arguments that some have raised to implementing these laws as Congress intended.
The article describes the reasons for the current inaction of the FEC and the IRS–the two
agencies charged with enforcing the relevant laws. It concludes that if the two agencies commit
today to enforcing the law as written, campaign finance reform will be a reality without waiting
for a messianic era of dramatic changes to the courts or Congress.
The project of reforming what can be reformed now is urgent as a matter of public policy.
Outside spending has increased dramatically since 2010, exceeding the rate of increase of total
federal campaign spending and even accounting for more spending than made by the candidates
in over 120 competitive races in the last decade. This article outlines the detrimental effects of
these developments on candidates, campaigns, and institutions, e.g., an increased threat of
corruption, intensified political polarization, marginalization of political parties, and increasing
levels of negative advertising. Because of the rapid rate at which outside spending is increasing,
the trajectory of these adverse impacts threatens the integrity of political campaigns in 2020 and
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Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).

2

SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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future elections.
Previous decades have witnessed repeated efforts to reform campaign finance practices.
In the 1990s, soft money3 was seen as the scourge of campaign finance because it enabled donors
to evade FECA regulations. At that time, favored vehicles for raising and spending soft money
were political parties and certain section 527 groups.4 The same period saw the emergence and
widespread use of so-called issue ads in the run-up to elections that escaped FECA regulation by
avoiding statements expressly urging the election or defeat of specific candidates in a federal
election.5
In response, Congress enacted legislation to restrain or eliminate soft money associated
with both political parties and 527 groups as well to curtail the misuse of issue ads. Since part of
the appeal of section 527 groups was their freedom from stringent disclosure requirements,
Congress passed a law in 2000 requiring those groups to disclose the identities of all contributors
of $200 or more in a calendar year.6 Subsequently Congress enacted the Bipartisan Campaign

3

“Soft money” is not a term of art in the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 86 Stat. 382,
as amended in 1974 (hereinafter FECA), codified at 52 U.S. §§ 301.01 et seq. Rather, it is a
shorthand used to describe money that is raised and spent without being restricted by FECA’s
source, amount, and (in many instances) disclosure rules. Campaign funds subject to these rules,
in contrast, are called “hard money.”
4

For the history, see McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 122-26 (2003); Frances R. Hill, Softer
Money: Exempt Organizations and Campaign Finance, 32 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 27, 40-42
(2001); Trevor Potter and Bryson B. Morgan, The History of Undisclosed Spending in U.S.
Elections & How 2012 Became the “Dark Money” Election, 27 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL’Y 383, 428-32 (2013). Organizations known as 527 groups because of the section of
the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) under which they are organized first emerged in 1975. See Pub.
L. No. 93-625, §10(a) (1975), codified at 26 U.S.C. §527.
5

See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 126-29; Richard Briffault, Issue Advocacy: Redrawing the
Elections/Politics Line, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1751 (1999).
6

See Pub. L. No. 106-230, 114 Stat. 477 (2000), §2, codified at 26 U.S.C. § 527(j). 527 groups
were used after BCRA because political parties were no longer permitted to receive soft money.
See Benjamin S. Feuer, Between Political Speech and Cold, Hard Cash: Evaluating the FEC’s
2

Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA),7 which prohibited political parties from raising or spending soft
money8 and restricted the availability of so-called issue ads funded by soft money on the eve of
primaries and elections.9 Although these provisions of BCRA were upheld in McConnell v.
FEC,10 their success was short-lived because what amounted to soft money soon flooded
politically active nonprofit organizations exempt from federal income taxation.11 Moreover, the
largely unregulated money raised by nonprofits is not only legally accumulated and spent; it is
also usually not subject to disclosure, inspiring the moniker “dark money.” The outcome of
Congress’s effort to rein in uncontrolled campaign spending was thus arguably worse than the
situation when soft money was raised by parties because at least those sums were subject to
reporting and disclosure.
For some commentators, these developments reflect a “hydraulic effect, i.e.,” reform
measures will inevitably prompt campaign money to find new outlets to influence elections and
to become less transparent to boot.12 The implication, as a policy matter, is that attempting

New Regulations for 527 Groups, 100 NW. U.L.REV. 925, 926-29 (2006). Cf. Edward B. Foley
& Donald B. Tobin, Tax Code Section 527 Groups Not an End-Run Around McCain-Feingold,
72 U.S. LAW WEEK 2403 (Jan. 20, 2004).
7

See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81
(2002), codified in different sections of FECA.
8

See 52 U.S.C. §30125(e).

9

See 52 U.S.C. §§30125(a)(1), (2); infra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
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540 U.S. at 188, 190 n.73, 194, 196.

11

See IRC §§501(a), 501(c)(4)-501(c)(6). The term “nonprofit” is a state law designation
applied to organizations that do not distribute profits to shareholders or similar constituencies.
Nonprofits that subsequently qualify for exemption from federal income taxation are called
“exempt organizations.” This article uses the two terms interchangeably.
12

See Frank J. Sorauf, Political Action Committees, in ANTHONY CORRADO, THOMAS E. MANN,
DANIEL R. ORTIZ & TREVOR POTTER, CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: A SOURCEBOOK 123, 128
3

campaign finance reform is likely to be unproductive or even counterproductive.
The story can be told another way, however. First, BCRA did contain a provision that
had teeth. The “electioneering communication” provision, which prohibited spending soft
money on certain kinds of advertising on the eve of primaries or elections, was successful at
requiring participants to use hard (regulated) money to fund much election advertising ostensibly
linked to issues rather than candidates during intense pre-election periods because the provision
relied on an objective test, namely, whether a candidate’s name (or identifying feature) was
included in the advertisement.13 Although the provision’s reach was limited in various ways,14 it
could not be easily evaded since, to be effective in influencing voters, election-eve advertising
usually identifies the candidate supported or opposed by the ad’s sponsors because pure issue
advocacy is less likely to motivate voters to vote for the advertiser’s preferred candidate.15
What derailed the electioneering communication provision’s effectiveness was not a
hydraulic shift of money from one funding vehicle to another, but the Supreme Court’s ruling in
FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, which rendered the provision largely ineffective by limiting its
reach to communications that are the functional equivalent of express advocacy, a type of

(1997); Samuel Issacharoff and Pamela Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform,
77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1713, 1717-18, 1729 (1999).
13

See 52 U.S.C. §30118(b)(2).

14

The provision covers communications broadcast on radio or television, not those in the print
or other media. The time limitation (30 days before a primary or 60 days before a general
election are covered) means that identical communications occurring outside those two windows
would not be affected and, hence, could be funded by soft money. For a comprehensive
overview, see FEC, Making Electioneering Communications,
www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/other-filers/making-electioneering-communicatio
ns. For the background of BCRA, see Potter & Morgan, supra note 4, at 433-38.
15

See Briffault, supra note 5, at 1787; Potter & Morgan, supra note 4, at 442 (stating that in
2004 and 2006, more than 90% of outside group spending was disclosed).
4

political speech already subject to regulation.16 As a result, an effective tool of campaign finance
reform was eliminated, opening the door to intense broadcast advertising on the eve of primaries
and general elections funded by soft money.
Second, three years later, another Supreme Court decision was responsible for nonprofit
organizations becoming key players in the surge of unprecedented amounts of money raised in
elections. In Citizens United v. FEC, the Court held that corporations could use their general
treasury funds to make independent expenditures and electioneering communications, while
previously they had been required to fund such spending using hard money raised in their
political action committees (PACs).17 The holding not only enabled commercial corporations to
spend their business revenues on political activities in potentially unlimited amounts;18 it
similarly permitted nonprofit corporations to engage in such spending as well. This, in turn,
motivated individuals and entities seeking anonymity to choose politically active nonprofits as
vehicles for their political spending because such nonprofits are rarely required to disclose the
identities of their donors.19 As a result, a significant part of outside group spending20 shifted to
nondisclosing nonprofits (dark money groups) during the nine months before the 2010 mid-term

16

See FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 456-57, 469-70 (2007). This part of
the opinion was signed only by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito. Id. at 455. The Court did
not, however, similarly narrow the meaning of electioneering communications subject to
disclosure. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 368-69 (2010).
17

See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365.

18

The degree to which commercial corporations have in fact increased their campaign spending
since Citizens United is a matter of dispute. See Miriam Galston, Buckley 2.0: Would the
Buckley Court Overturn Citizens United?, 22 U. PA. J. CONST.L. 687, 704-05 (2020).
19

See Tara Malloy, A New Transparency: How to Ensure Disclosure from “Mixed-Purpose”
Groups after Citizens United, 46 U.S.F.L. REV. 425, 429-30 (2011).
20

See infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
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elections,21 and these groups have continued to play an outsize role in campaigns ever since.22
Third, the ease with which money has been able to flood outside groups of all kinds since
2010 is due in large part to the narrow definition of corruption established by Citizens United and
its concurrent assertion that uncoordinated spending cannot be corrupting as a matter of law.23
That reasoning led an appellate court the same year (SpeechNow.org v. FEC) to extend the
reasoning of Citizens United to permit contributions in unlimited amounts by individuals or
entities to independent spending groups.24 The SpeechNow.org holding, in turn, led to the
emergence of independent expenditure groups known as SuperPACS, which have increased
dramatically since 2010 in number and the amounts they raise and spend on elections.25 Citizens
United also made possible contributions of unlimited amounts to certain nonprofit organizations

21

See Malloy, supra note 18, at 432-33. Citizens United was published on January 21, 2010,
and the election occurred on November 2, 2010. The magnitude of the shift cannot be quantified
because the nonprofits in question do not disclose the identities of their donors.
22

See Karl Evers-Hillstrom, More money, less transparency: A decade under Citizens United,
OPENSECRETS.ORG 10 (“Outside Spending by Group (2004-2018 Cycles)),”
https://www.opensecrets.org/news/reports/a-decade-under-citizens-united. Campaign spending
by nonprofits reported to the FEC was less in 2016 than in 2012. There are many possible
explanations. First, not all their campaign spending needs to be reported to the FEC:
electioneering expenditures are reportable only for the thirty days before a primary and sixty days
before an election. It is thus impossible to quantify similar expenditures outside those windows.
In addition, it seems that nonprofits have not been reporting contributions they make to
SuperPACs that, in turn, spend this money on campaign activities. Further, some contributors
may have shifted from nonprofits to SuperPACs in 2015-2016 because, until December 31, 2015,
contributions to nonprofits that exceeded the annual gift tax exclusion could trigger gift tax
imposed upon the donor. See Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015 (the “PATH
Act”), §408, Pub. L. 114-113 (eliminating this gift tax exposure). Further, because nearly half of
SuperPACs are single-candidate independent expenditure entities, donors may perceive them as
virtually guaranteed to use their contributions in ways benefitting the donors’ preferred
candidates, while the political spending of nonprofits may be less easily controlled.
23

See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359-61.

24

599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010).

25

In 2016, for example, outside groups raised $1.6 and spent $1.1.
6

exempt from federal income taxation, such as section 501(c)(4) groups that satisfy the standard
for independence enforced by the FEC, but are nonetheless closely associated with one or more
candidates.26 As noted, contributions to such organizations are additionally attractive because
the groups rarely need to identify their contributors and the amounts of the money each
gives.
As the consequences of these judicial decisions have come to the fore, several aspects of
contemporary campaign funding are increasingly viewed as problematic. First, there is
widespread concern that the amount of money now spent in certain races is undesirable because
it requires candidates and office holders to spend excessive amounts of time raising funds,
creates a barrier for the non-affluent who want to run for office, makes candidates and
officeholders reliant upon outside spending funded by a small number of extremely wealthy
individuals and entities,27 and leads to the electoral and governing processes being viewed as
corrupt by the public.28 Importantly, because outside group spending is frequently funded by

26

See Amanda R. Schwarzenbart, Comment: Coordination is Corruption: An Argument for the
Regulation of Coordinated Issue Advocacy under Campaign Finance Law, 66 EMORY L.J. 1493,
1524-25 (2017). See also infra notes 75-77.
27

See Karl Evers-Hillstrom, Super PACs outmaneuver outdated rules to leave voters in the dark,
OPENSECRETS NEWS (Mar. 18, 2020) (noting that one donor gave a SuperPAC backing Elizabeth
Warren in the 20020 presidential primaries $14.6 million of its $14.8 million budget),
https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2020/03/sunshine-week-2020-super-pacs-loophole; Richard
Briffault, Campaign spending isn’t the problem–where the money comes from is, THE
CONVERSATION (Nov. 2, 2018), https://theconversation.com/campaign-spending-isntthe-problem-where-the-money-comes-from-is-104093.
28

See, e.g., Molly J. Walker Wilson, Financing Elections and "Appearance of Corruption":
Citizen Attitudes and Behavior, 63 CATH. U. L.REV. 953, 980 (2014) (citing survey data); Ben
Jacobs & David Smith, 'Politics Are Corrupt': Fears About Money and its Influence on Elections
Loom Large, GUARDIAN (Jul. 8, 2016),
www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jul/08/trump-clinton-sanders-super-pacs-election-money
(noting that before the 2016 presidential elections, individuals "raised [the issue of campaign
finance reform] as one of their main concerns").
7

contributions unlimited in amount, such groups now raise and spend more money on certain
races than do candidates and parties.29 Further, there is virtual consensus about the need for
greater transparency regarding the sources of funding in elections, including the identities of
contributors to dark money funding vehicles.30 Hiding the identities of contributors denies the
voting public of the type of information that courts have long argued is essential to enable
citizens to make informed choices about candidates to support or oppose.31 Dark money
organizations and outside groups more broadly have become symbols of these problems.
Thus, the greater part of the increased sums injected into outside groups since 2010 has
come from a surge in newly legalized sources for campaign funding, i.e., very large contributions
by high wealth individuals and entities to groups operating in a manner only technically
independent of candidates and parties.32 The main cause of the rapid increase in campaign
contributions and spending by SuperPACs and exempt organizations in the last decade, then, was
judicial decisions making unlimited outside campaign spending possible.

29

See infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.

30

See Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S.186, 228 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (asserting that without
transparency and public accountability, “democracy is doomed”); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at
369. Courts recognize the possible need for an exception if disclosure of the identities of
contributors could lead to harassment or retaliation. See also id., 558 U.S. at 370. However, to
date the courts have found few instances of threats that justify exempting persons from
disclosure. Justice Thomas often opposes disclosure, see Del. Strong Families v. Denn, 136 S.
Ct. 2376 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
31

See infra notes 119, 125, 205, 234 and accompanying texts.

32

See Super PACs: How Many Donors Give, OPENSECRETS.ORG (showing that in 2016, the top
1% of donors gave 88.6% of the money contributed to SuperPACs),
https://www.opensecrets.org/outside-spending/donor-stats?cycle=2016&type=I. In 2018, the top
1% of donors gave 96% of the money given to SuperPACs. See
https://www.opensecrets.org/outside-spending/donor-stats?cycle=2018&type=I. Because exempt
organizations are not required to disclose their donors, there are no statistics about the percentage
of contributions to them made by high wealth individuals.
8

An additional cause of this phenomenon is the lax enforcement or non-enforcement of
politically active exempt organizations by the IRS as these groups have ventured more and more
prominently into election financing.33 Finally, the FEC has been unable or unwilling to enforce
provisions of campaign finance law, including its own regulations, although the reasons for its
inaction differ from those that have paralyzed the IRS.34
What, then, can be done? As this preamble suggests, outside spending groups are a
significant cause of the problems described, and they threaten to assume an ever greater role if
current trends continue.35 Therefore, this analysis focuses on problems caused by outside
spending groups. Yet it is critical to acknowledge at the start that interest groups perform an
important function in a democracy and constitute the foundation of a healthy civil society. The
objective of campaign finance reform is not to eliminate or gag interest groups. It is rather to call
attention to certain excesses of some politically active interest groups and the ways they have
begun to affect electoral politics adversely.
The thesis of this analysis is that the undesirable consequences of the surge in outside
group spending in the last decade can be ameliorated, although not eliminated, if existing law
already on the books is enforced.36 Specifically, the FEC should enforce FECA’s rules governing
the classification of nonprofits as political committees and its disclosure requirements for
nonprofits not needing to be classified as political committees. Similarly, the IRS should enforce

33

See infra Part V.

34

See infra Part VI.

35

See infra Part I.

36

See infra Parts II-IV.
9

existing tax law rules governing nonprofits to curb the prevalence of dark money and refocus
501(c) organizations on their core missions.
In short, even without new legislation or overturning Citizens United, many of the worst
excesses of contemporary campaign finance could be lessened. And without discounting the
potential for hydraulic effects to funnel money into new, or newly attractive, campaign vehicles,
there is considerable room as a legal matter and urgent need as a policy matter to improve
campaign finance regulation now to better reflect common sense notions of integrity in the
electoral system.
I. THE TRAJECTORY OF OUTSIDE SPENDING
Definitions of the term“outside spending” differ, depending upon whether the term
includes everything except candidate spending37 or everything except spending by candidates and
political parties.38 Thus, statistics about outside spending or the relative proportion of outside to
other spending must be examined to determine what exactly is being measured. In what follows,
outside spending excludes both candidate and party spending and
includes spending by PACs, SuperPACs, nonprofits, corporations, and others.39
A. Outside Spending Has Increased Rapidly and Dominates Many Races
In general, total spending on federal races increases with every presidential election cycle
37

See Outside Spending, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending;
David B. Magleby, The 2012 Election as a Team Sport, in DAVID B. MAGLEBY, FINANCING THE
2012 ELECTION 2 (2014).
38

See Ian Vandewalker, Election Spending 2016: Outside Groups Outspend Candidates and
Parties in Key Senate Races, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Nov. 1, 2016),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Election%20Spending%202016%
20outside%20groups%20outspend.pdf.
39

“Others” includes IRC 527 groups not registered with the FEC, business entities other than
corporations, and individuals.
10

and also with off-year elections, although off-year elections typically cost less than presidential
ones.40 At the same time, the rate of increase differs depending upon the category of
spender (e.g., candidates, parties, PACs, exempt organizations), the recipient category (House,
Senate, President), and the particular circumstances of individual campaigns (e.g., incumbent is
up for re-election, open seat, primary or general election, presidential election year or mid-term).
Despite these variations, consistent trends have begun to emerge. Most prominent is
spending by SuperPACs, a campaign vehicle that did not exist before 2010. Because they are
classified as independent expenditure groups, i.e., they cannot coordinate with candidates as
coordination is defined in FEC regulations and Advisory Opinions,41 SuperPACs are permitted to
40

See Nathaniel Persily, Robert F. Bauer, & Benjamin L. Ginsberg, Campaign Finance in the
United States: Assessing an Era of Fundamental Change, BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR. 15 (Jan.
2018) (in current dollars) (including federal election spending totals from 1990-2016 and
breaking totals down by type of spender),
https://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/BPC-Democracy-Campaign-Finance-inthe-United-States.pdf. According to this source, total federal election spending in 2008 was
$5,129,249,433; in 2012, $6,112,168,473; in 2016, $6,396,456,291. Id. That is a rate of increase
of roughly 25% between the 2008 and 2016 presidential elections.
Spending does not always increase over time: federal parties spent somewhat less in 2016
than in 2012, as did candidates for president. Id. Congressional candidates often spend less in
election cycles with presidential races than in the previous off-year election because of greater
competition for funding. See DANIEL P. TOKAJI & RENATA E. B. STRAUSE, THE NEW SOFT
MONEY: OUTSIDE SPENDING IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 32 (Figure 1), 34 (2014). See also
Cost of Election, OPENSECRETS.ORG (adjusted for inflation),
https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/cost.php?display=T&infl=Y. Because Michael
Bloomberg spent almost $900 million in the 2020 primaries, figures for aggregate spending in
that race will likely be inflated. See Shane Goldmacher, Michael Bloomberg Spent More Than
$900 Million on His Failed Presidential Run, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2020,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/20/us/politics/bloomberg-campaign-900-million.html.
Spending in the 2015-2016 presidential contest was lower than expected because Trump
benefitted from an unusual amount of free publicity. See Niv M. Sultan, OpenSecrets News,
Election 2016: Trump’s free media helped keep cost down but fewer donors provided more of the
cash, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2017/04/
election-2016-trump-fewer-donors-provided-more-of-the-cash; Nicholas Confessore & Karen
Yourish, $2 Billion Worth of Free Media for Donald Trump, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2016,
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/16/upshot/measuring-donald-trumpsmammoth-advantage-in-free-media.html.
41

See 11 C.F.R. §§100.16, 109.1-109.23; FEC, Making Independent Expenditures,
https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/making-independent-expenditures/. For
11

accept contributions of any size.42 The contrast implied is with traditional PACs, which cannot
receive contributions in excess of $5,000 for each primary and each general election from any
donor.43 In 2011-2012, the first presidential election after they were established, SuperPACs
spent roughly $610 million, while in 2015-2016, they spent over $1.1 billion dollars,44 an
increase of roughly 80% over 2011-2012. In 2013-2014, the first full off-year congressional
election after Citizens United, SuperPACs spent $345 million, while in 2017-2018, the second
such cycle, they spent $822 million,45 almost 240% more than in 2013-2014. The rate of increase
in SuperPAC spending, in other words, far outpaces that of total campaign spending.46
The situation with nonprofit groups is more complicated. Cycle-to-cycle reported

illustrative Advisory Opinions, see FEC AOs 2017-10, 2016-21, 2015-09, 2015-04, 2011-12,
2010-09. On FEC Advisory Opinions generally, see Michael M. Franz, The Federal Election
Commission as Regulator: The Changing Evaluations of Advisory Opinions, 3 U.C. IRVINE L.
REV. 735 (2013).
42

See FEC, Registering as a Super PAC,
https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and- committees/filing-pac-reports/registering-super-pac/.
43

See FEC, Contribution Limits,
www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/ candidate-taking-receipts/contribution-limits/.
44

See Persily, et al., supra note 40, at 31. According to OpenSecrets.org, in the 2016 cycle
SuperPACs raised slightly less than $1.8 billion and spent $1,066,914,448. 2016 Outside
Spending by Super PAC, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2016&chrt=V&disp=O&type=S.
For the methodology used by OpenSecrets.org, see
https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/ methodology.php. The claim that in 2016 SuperPACs
spent 17 times more than in 2010, when they were first established, Persily, et al., supra note 40,
at 17, is misleading because 2010 was a non-presidential year and SuperPACs operated for less
than one-half the election cycle.
45

For the 2014 numbers, see Persily, et al., supra note 40, at 31; for the 2018 numbers, see
Outside Spending, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/fes_summ.php?cycle=2018.
46

See supra note 40 for the rate of increase of total election spending 2008-2012; Persily, et al.,
supra note 40, at 31.
12

spending by nonprofit organizations peaked in 2012 and has declined since then,47 but not all
spending by these groups is reported.48 Nonprofits may have shifted some spending from express
advocacy and electioneering communications, which are reported, to issue advocacy and ads
placed outside the electioneering communication window,49 which are not. Since the latter are
not disclosed,50 there is no way to compare such spending before and after Citizens United and
SpeechNow.org to see if it has increased because of an influx of unrestricted contributions and, if
so, by how much. Since this period saw a surge of unlimited contributions to politically active
independent-expenditure nonprofits, it is likely that considerable amounts were spent on electionrelated issue advocacy rather than amounts reportable to the FEC both because some believe such
advocacy is more effective than outright appeals to vote for specific candidates and because
nonprofits are subject to a ceiling on their campaigning under IRS regulations.51 Moreover, when

47

See Political Nonprofits (Dark Money), OPENSECRETS.ORG,
opensecrets.org/outsidespending/nonprof_summ.php. The reason is unknown. According to one
source, the decline reflected “a lack of enthusiasm ... about the presidential race.” Robert
Maguire, OpensSecrets News: $1.4 billion and counting in spending by SuperPACs, dark money
groups, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2016/
11/1-4-billion-and-counting-in-spending-by-super-pacs-dark- money-groups/.
48

See, e.g., David B. Magleby, SuperPACs and 501(c) Groups in the 2016 Elections 31 (Nov.
2017), https://www.uakron.edu/bliss/state-of-the-parties/papers/magleby.pdf (noting nine
candidates for president in 2015-2016 who had affiliated 501(c)(4) groups that reported no
expenditures to the FEC).
49

See supra note 18.

50

See Justin Levitt, The Drunkard’s Search for Money in Politics, SUMMARY JUDGMENTS (May
27, 2014) (cautioning that we know little about “darker-than-dark” money, i.e., money spent by
exempt organizations on issue advocacy intended to influence an election),
http://summaryjudgments.lls.edu/2014/05/the-drunkards-search-for-money-in.html.
51

See, e.g., Treas. Reg. §1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2). See also Kim Barker, How Nonprofits Spend
Millions on Elections and Call It Public Welfare, PROPUBLICA (Aug.18, 2012),
https://www.propublica.org/article/how-nonprofits-spend-millions-on-elections-and-call-it-public
-welfare (describing groups that report higher amounts of political spending in a year to the FEC
than to the IRS).
13

nonprofit groups contribute to SuperPACs, they do not necessarily report the sums involved as
political expenditures. During the 2018 mid-term election cycle, nonprofits and other
nondisclosing groups gave more than $176 million to SuperPACs and hybrid PACs,52 none of
which would have been reported to the FEC. Thus, the decline of reported spending by
nonprofits in 2016 may reflect their adoption of different strategies for influencing elections
rather than a reduction in political spending. In any event, the aggregate of reported outside
spending from all sources in presidential elections has increased dramatically since Citizens
United and SpeechNow.org were decided.53
Consistent with these statistics, the impact of outside spending since Citizens United and
SpeechNow.org is dramatic. For example, in 2012, almost 30% of the television ads run in
federal elections were funded by outside sources, while four years earlier they represented
roughly 8 percent.54 By the 2015-2016 cycle, 29% of political ads in the presidential race alone
were funded by outside sources.55 Further, in that cycle, aggregate outside spending was
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See https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2019/01/dark-money/.

53

See Outside Spending, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/fes_summ.php?cycle=2012 (showing outside spending
during 2011-2012 was $1,038,812,960); Outside Spending, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/fes_summ.php?cycle=2016 (showing outside spending
during 2015-2016 was $1,417,279,238). Since the total numbers on the OpenSecrets.org
websites include some party spending, I have deducted those amounts to calculate outside
spending during these election cycles. For the increases in off-year cycles, see supra note 40 and
accompanying text.
54

See Erika Franklin Fowler, Michael M. Franz, Travis N. Ridout, The Blue Wave: Assessing
Political Advertising Trends and Democratic Advantages in 2018, 53 PS: POLITICAL SCIENCE &
POLITICS 57, 61 (2020) (Table 8).
55

See Erika Franklin Fowler, Travis N. Ridout, and Michael M. Franz, Political Advertising in
2016: The Presidential Election as Outlier?, 14 THE FORUM 445, 447 (2016).
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estimated to be almost 25% of all (reported) federal election spending.56 According to the
Wesleyan Media Project, as of May 10, more than half of the political ads aired in 2019-2020
were funded by dark money groups alone.57
Aggregate numbers, moreover, obscure greater impacts in specific settings. For example,
more than half of the ads in the Republican presidential primaries in 2012 and 2016 were funded
by outside groups,58 and some statistics by election cycle obscure the fact that the percentage was
“even higher” in the months preceding an election.59 In addition, because spending by federal
candidates and their campaigns has decreased slightly since 2008,60 spending by outside sources
not only represents an increasingly large percentage of federal election spending. It sometimes
competes with and occasionally has eclipsed candidate spending. In the 2013-2014 cycle, for
example, outside spending in four of five competitive Senate races was more than candidate
spending in those races, with outside groups accounting for almost half the spending in those
critical races.61 In 2015, outside groups supporting particular candidates for president raised
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See Maguire, supra note 47; Outside Spending, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/fes_summ.php?cycle=2016.
57

See Anna Massoglia & Ilma Hasan, ‘Dark Money’ overshadows 2020 election political ad
spending, OPENSECRETS.ORG, May 19, 2020,
https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2020/05/dark-money-20-political-ad-spending/.
58

See WMP/CPR Special Report Outside Group Activity, 2000-2016, WESLEYAN MEDIA
PROJECT/OPENSECRETS.ORG, Aug. 24, 2016.
59

See also Fowler et al., supra note 54, at 61 (noting that figures for outside group television
advertising since 2012 obscured that the percentage was “even higher” in the months preceding
an election and in competitive races).
60

See Zachary Albert, Trends in Campaign Financing, 1980-2016, Report for Campaign
Finance Task Force, BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR. 19-20 (2016), https:/bipartisanpolicy.org/
wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Trends-in-Campaign-Financing-1980-2016.-Zachary-Albert..pdf.
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Ian Vandewalker, Election Spending in 2014: Outside Spending in Senate Races since
Citizens United, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE 1, 5 (2015),
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more than twice as much as did the campaigns themselves.62 In 2016, in twenty-seven
congressional races, outside money exceeded candidate spending by almost 2:1.63 As
summarized by one watchdog group, “Outside spending surpassed candidate spending in 126
races since [Citizens United]. That happened just 15 times in the five election cycles prior.”64
In sum, since Citizens United and SpeechNow.org, outside spending has been fueled by
contributions unlimited in size made to groups formally classified as independent according to
the FEC. This has enabled outside spending to increase dramatically in absolute terms. It has
also allowed outside spending to represent an increasing proportion of overall election-related
spending, to compete with more traditional sources of campaign financing, and in some
instances, to dwarf spending by candidates or political parties. The consequences of these
changes are complex because they affect the behaviors of other sources of campaign spending
and, to a degree not yet understood, alter the dynamic among those who finance federal elections.
The remainder of this Part and the following Part discuss the immediate and likely long-term
effects of the steep upward trajectory of outside group campaign financing.
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications. Vandewalker called races
competitive if they were considered “toss-ups” based upon polls in the two months before the
election. Id. at 4. The candidates accounted for 41% of spending, while parties accounted for 12
percent. Id. at 5.
62

See Ian Vandewalker, Shadow Campaigns: The Shift in Presidential Campaign Funding to
Outside Groups, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE 1, 2-3 (2015) (noting that during that period,
candidates’ campaign committees raised $129 million, compared to outside groups, which raised
$283 million),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/ Report_Shadow_Campaigns.pdf.
63

See Niv M. Sultan, Outside groups spent more than candidates in 27 races, often by huge
amounts, OPENSECRETS NEWS, Feb. 24, 2017 (noting that in those 27 races, candidates spent a
total of almost $367 million, while outside spending exceeded $683 million),
https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2017/02/outside-groups-spent-more-than-candidates-in-27-rac
es- often-by-huge-amounts/.
64

Evers-Hillstrom, supra note 22 (emphasis in original).
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B. Consequences of Increases in Outside Spending
Many commentators believe that the increase in spending by sources other than
candidates and political parties is detrimental to the political process. Of course, there has
always been outside spending in elections, but as described in the preceding section, it is mainly
in the election cycles since Citizens United and SpeechNow.org that outside spending has
routinely exceeded party spending, has exceeded spending by candidates in specific races, and
threatens to exceed candidate spending in an increasing number of races. Further, since those
decisions, outside spending as a proportion of total campaign spending has increased at a greater
rate than other forms of campaign spending.65 Based upon the trajectory from 2008 to 2016, it is
obvious that the unlimited campaign contributions made possible by Citizens United and
SpeechNow.org have reversed the decades-old pattern of candidates spending the vast majority of
the money spent during federal campaigns.
Is this change problematic? Commentators express a variety of concerns about this new
phenomenon, ranging from its effects on candidate behavior–before, during, and after elections-to its impact on institutions.
To determine the effect of outside spending on candidate and officeholder behavior,
Daniel Tokaji and Renata Strause interviewed current and former members of Congress,
congressional staff, and people associated with outside spending groups.66 They found that
outside groups influence the agendas of candidates, both before and after their elections, in
numerous ways. Members of Congress frequently feel pressured to adopt large contributors’

65

See Evers-Hillstrom, supra note 22; Persily, et al., supra note 40, at 15.

66

See TOKAJI & STRAUSE, supra note 40.
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agendas from concern that otherwise those contributors will not support them or will even
support their opponents.67 Occasionally members have received explicit threats from outside
spenders,68 although more often the threat is implicit. Those who spoke to Tokaji and Strause
felt that scorecards published by outside groups significantly influence lawmakers’ voting and
that the threat is especially feared in connection with primary elections.69 Clearly, outside groups
have long influenced candidates and officeholders in these ways and there is nothing unusual,
much less invidious, about citizens saying that they won’t support, financially or otherwise, a
candidate whose policies they dislike. What is different today is that the vastness of the amounts
of money at stake since Citizens United and SpeechNow.org has created risks that did not exist
previously when spending by outside groups was relatively small compared to spending by
candidates and political parties.70 In short, as outside group money increasingly dominates other
spending, there is a risk that candidates will feel beholden to those groups to an unprecedented
degree rather than to a wider range of constituents.
Relatedly, critics of the increasingly important role of outside spending characterize it as
an end-run around contribution limits.71 Because courts since Buckley v. Valeo have consistently

67

See TOKAJI & STRAUSE, supra note 40, at 76-79, 82-83. A threat to back an opponent would
seem credible for a primary, but less likely in a general election.
68

See TOKAJI & STRAUSE, supra note 40, at 81-82.

69

See TOKAJI & STRAUSE, supra note 40, at 83-87.

70

See, e.g., Briffault, SuperPACs, 2012 COLUM. L. REV. 1644, 1687 (stating that “[i]n New
Hampshire and South Carolina the SuperPACs backing Ron Paul and Rick Santorum ‘seemed to
be defining the battlefield for the two candidates’”).
71

See Dan Froomkin, Candidate-Specific SuperPACs Offer End Run For Maxed-Out Donors:
Study, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 4, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2011/10/04/candidate-specific-super-pacs-donors_n_994260.html; Vandewalker, Election
Spending 2014, supra note 61, 2 (arguing that outside spending “threatens to eviscerate two
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identified contributions to candidates as the greatest potential source of corruption,72 an end-run
around contribution limits opens the door to rapidly increasing opportunities for the reality or
appearance of corruption.73 This threat of corruption is magnified now that politically active
independent-expenditure nonprofits, which are rarely required to identify their donors, are
permitted to received contributions of unlimited amounts, potentially involving millions or tens
of millions of dollars.74 Despite being independent as a matter of law, many independentexpenditure groups maintain strong connections to the candidates they support. For example, the
groups are frequently established and operated by former staff members of the candidate in
question; use common vendors, such as pollsters and consultants, with the candidate; are
increasingly operated to benefit a single candidate; can feature the supported candidate as a
speaker at their fundraising events; and are even permitted to allow the candidates they are
funding to solicit contributions at the events the groups hold to raise money for their
campaigns.75 Firewalls that enable them to claim independence under campaign finance laws

cornerstones of the regulation of money in politics: contribution limits and transparency”).
72

See Buckley, 421U.S. at 28-29.

73

Corruption can be initiated by candidates as well as by donors. See Jennifer Mueller, The
Unwilling Donor, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1783 (2015).
74

See Outside Spending by Disclosure, Excluding Party Committees, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/disclosure.php.
75

See Galston, supra note 18, at 738-39, 752 n.306 and accompanying text (summarizing types
of relationships between candidates and independent groups); FEC, Definition of a Political
Committee, 66 Fed. Reg. 13681, 13683 (Mar. 7, 2001) (Notice of proposed rulemaking)
(referring to the “guise of independence” of such groups). See also David B. Magleby & Jay
Goodliffe, Interest Groups in the 2016 Election, FINANCING THE 2016 ELECTION 107 (ed. David
B. Magleby) (2019) (arguing that many SuperPACs had such close ties to parties that it might be
incorrect to view parties as weak). See also Michael M. Franz, Erika Franklin Fowler, and
Travis N. Ridout, Loose Cannons or Loyal Foot Soldiers? Toward a More Complex Theory of
Interest Group Advertising Strategies, 60 AMER. J. POL. SCI. 738 (2016) (finding that messaging
of multi-issue interest groups tends to reflect the positions of candidates they support, although
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appear flimsy to ordinary citizens not trained in the technical standards adopted by the FEC.76
Because candidates usually know the identities of large donors,77 even if these are not publicly
disclosed, it would be surprising if candidates were indifferent to the positions urged by their
largest contributors.
On the surface, the threat of corruption due to coordination may seem in tension with the
threat of excessive pressure exerted by large contributors, discussed earlier. Are donors and
candidates working together or not? The two threats can, however, exist simultaneously if there
is a lack of true independence, arguably permitted by the lax rules for independence, and it is the
large contributor rather than the candidate who wields the greater degree of power.
Among the most serious accusations made against the surge of outside spending is that it
accelerates polarization. Critics who level this charge note that interest groups and wealthy
individuals tend to be “intensely ideological.”78 Accordingly, as their influence grows, they exert
pressure on the electoral system to produce increasingly polarized outcomes, hastening the
tendency toward polarization that has characterized politics in America in recent years.79 Recent

that is less true of single-issue membership groups).
76

See FEC Advisory Opinion 2010-09, July 22, 2010; Eliza Newlin Carney, Firewall Between
Candidates and SuperPACs Breaking Down. Rules of the Game, ROLL CALL (Feb. 18, 2014),
https://www.rollcall.com/2014/02/18/firewall-between-candidates-and-super-pacsbreaking-down-rules-of-the-game.
77

See TOKAJI & STRAUSE, supra note 40, at 76-77. This is also common sense, since the groups
and the candidates can, and do, have contact, as long as there is no coordination about ad buys,
the content of election-related messages, etc. Sometimes a candidate’s campaign recommends an
independent expenditure entity to a donor that has maxed out on contributions to the candidate.
78

See RAYMOND J. LA RAJA & BRIAN F. SCHAFFNER, CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND POLITICAL
POLARIZATION xiv (2015). Frequently this is because interest groups form around a single issue.
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See LA RAJA & SCHAFFNER, supra note 78, at xiv.
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empirical research finds that as the amounts contributed by PACs grows, political parties become
increasingly fragmented.80 According to one commentator, this contrasts with previous outside
groups, such as traditional PACs and entities representing commercial interests because, since
2010, “the plurality of new groups” have been membership and ideological groups that further
more extreme positions.81
Several commentators concerned about the level of polarization in elections and in
political life more generally believe that the marginalization of political parties in the last
decade,82 a byproduct of the prominence of outside groups, has been a significant cause of the
tendency toward extremes in elections. For these theorists, it is political parties that traditionally
held officeholders accountable and were forces for negotiation and compromise, characteristics
enabling them to counter tendencies toward extreme positions.83 For example, according to
80

See Mike Norton & Richard H. Pildes, How Outside Money Makes Governing More Difficult,
20 ELECTION L. J. 1 (2020) (comparing contribution amounts at the state level and interviewing
lawmakers, staff, and party officials).
81

See Albert, supra note 60, at 13-14 (stating that prior to 2010, business groups spent the most
of outside groups on elections, while ideological groups have outspent business groups since
2010). See also David Blankenhorn, The Top Fourteen Causes of Polarization, THE AMERICAN
INTEREST (May 16, 2018),
https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/05/16/the-top-14-causes-of-political-polarization/
(including the rise of identity-group politics among the main causes of polarization). Cf. Richard
Pildes, Participation and Polarization, 22 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 341, 345 (2020) (arguing that
individual small donors are often as polarizing, and sometimes more polarizing, than other
participants in elections).
82

See, e.g., Fowler et al., supra note 54, at 61 (noting that television advertising by parties in the
last decade has decreased from 20%-39% of all such advertising to 10%),
https://www.cambridge.org/core/ journals/ps-political-science-and-politics/article/ bluewave-assessing-political-advertising-trends-and-democratic-advantages-in-2018/5545DDBE5126
7FEBB492E08F24DD4B3E/share/d5c20e79fb7a891983284e83528113ef16b344bf.
83

See LA RAJA & SCHAFFNER, supra note 78, at iv; Jonathan Rauch, Political Realism: How
Hacks, Machines, Big Money, and Back-Room Deals Can Strengthen American Democracy, in
WILLIAM F. CONNELLY, ET AL., VIRTUES AND DEFECTS OF PARTISANSHIP, POLARIZATION,
GRIDLOCK 189, 190-194 (2017). See also NANCY ROSENBLUM, ON THE SIDE OF THE ANGELS: AN
APPRECIATION OF PARTIES AND PARTISANSHIP (2010).
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Richard Pildes, the “diffusion of political power away from the political parties” and the
counterpart weakening of the power of leadership within parties have reduced opportunities for
“the kinds of negotiations, compromises, and pragmatic deal-making that enable government to
function effectively, at least in areas of broad consensus that government must act in some way
(budgets, debt-ceiling increases).”84 For Pildes, this occurs because officeholders are freed from
the moderating tendencies of parties by virtue of their ability to raise unlimited amounts of
money from interest groups, and the potential synergy between officeholders and interests groups
is especially potent when politics in general is polarized.85
Parties are often seen as moderating forces because they “have the strongest incentives,
through elections, to aggregate the broadest range of interests”86 and to make deals that “stick.”87
Individual officeholders, according to this view, tend to have short-term horizons, typically their
own re-election, while political parties see the need for strategic, long-term planning.88 Parties
also have broad agendas because they aim at attracting voters across the nation and rely on
coalitions to govern effectively.89 In contrast, outside groups, especially exempt organizations
and many SuperPACs, are often motivated by the “insular interests” favored by their donors
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See Richard Pildes, How to Strengthen our Polarized Politics? Strengthen political parties.,
Monkey-Cage, WASH. POST (Feb. 6, 2014).
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See Pildes, supra note 84.
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See Pildes, supra note 84.
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See Rauch, supra note 83, at 190, 192
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See Rauch, supra note 83, at 195.
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See Ian Vandewalker & Daniel I. Weiner, Stronger Parties, Stronger Democracy: Rethinking
Reform, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE 4, 8 (2015)
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rather than positions that could appeal to a national majority.90 As a consequence, such groups
tend to support more ideologically extreme candidates and officeholders, which intensifies an
existing trend for fewer moderates to be elected to office in both parties.91
The growing importance of outside groups is also criticized because of the tendency of
outside groups to fund negative advertising. Research by the Campaign Finance Institute reveals
that from 1990 until 2010, almost without exception, non-party independent expenditures in
Congressional races went to support candidates rather than to defeat them; in 2010 and
subsequent elections, in contrast, in all but one race, independent expenditures to defeat
candidates for either house of Congress exceeded, or far exceeded, those to support them.92
According to the Wesleyan Media Project, the number of negative ads in the 2018 off-year
federal election surpassed those in 2014 by 61 percent.93 While candidate-sponsored ads tended
to be positive,94 group-sponsored ads were between 72% and 92% negative.95
90

See T. Hart Benton, Rethinking Political Party Contribution Limits: A Roadmap to Reform, 63
LOYOLA L. REV. 257, 278-79 (2017).
91

See Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized
Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 277 (2011) (listing sources documenting the
decreasing presence of moderates in Congress in the late 1990's and early 2000's).
92

See Michael J. Malbin & Brendan Glavin, CFI’s Guide to Money in Federal Elections: Essays
and Tables Covering the Elections of 1974-2018, THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE INSTITUTE 80 (Jan.
2020). The exception before 2010 was in 2006, when independent expenditures against
Republicans in Congressional races were almost twice the amount spent to support Republicans
in those races. Id. The exception in 2010 occurred when independent expenditures to support
Republican candidates for the Senate exceeded those to defeat them. Id.
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See 61% Increase in Volume of Negative Ads, WESLEYAN MEDIA PROJECT (Oct. 30, 2018)
(Figure 1) (calculating the figures as of October 25, i.e., a week before the election),
https://mediaproject.wesleyan.edu/103018/. These numbers cover only broadcast television and
national network and cable ads, not local cable ads. Id. The percentage of television attack ads
was actually lower in 2018 than in 2014, but may have seemed greater due to the increase in
volume. See Fowler et al., supra note 54, at 60.
94

See Half of Senate Ads Negative in Past Month, WESLEYAN MEDIA PROJECT (Oct. 4, 2018)
(Table 5), https:// mediaproject.wesleyan.edu/100418 (showing Democratic candidate-sponsored
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In short, outside groups now routinely outspend political parties, diminishing parties’
moderating influences, and they concentrate their resources on negative advertising. They also
increasingly outspend candidates in competitive races. The result of this surge in the fundraising
power of outside groups is most visible when such groups back or try to defeat candidates in
primaries, but the effect of their power is present, although less visibly, when they affect
candidates’ messaging96 or their agendas once elected.97
The preceding claims about the potential dangers of outside spending need to be
qualified. First, equating all non-candidate, non-party spending with outside spending glosses
over the close connections that some candidates and parties have with outside groups. This is
especially apparent with single-candidate SuperPACs, which are formed to raise unlimited funds
to engage in independent spending on behalf of specific candidates.98 They are classified as
ads on broadcast T.V. from September 4 to October 1, 2018, were between 14% and 18%
negative and Republican candidate-sponsored T.V. ads then were between 33% and 37%
negative).
95

See Half of Senate Ads Negative in Past Month, supra note 94 (Table 6) (showing that groupsponsored broadcast T.V. ads for Senate races between Sept. 4 and Oct. 1 were equally negative
whether they were pro-Republicans or pro-Democrats, whereas Republican group-sponsored
T.V. ads for House races during that time frame were twenty percentage points higher than
Democratic ones (72% v. 92%)).
96

For example, Tokaji and Strause found a number of staffers believe that outside groups
interfered with candidates’ own messaging during the campaign by funding ads that the candidate
did not endorse and, in some instances, would not have endorsed. See TOKAJI & STRAUSE, supra
note 40, at 61-62, 64, 78-79. Candidates cannot work with outside groups on the groups’
messages because the groups must be independent of candidates to be permitted to raise
unlimited amounts of money from donors. Such instances cause candidates to lose control of
their message, since the electorate typically does not distinguish between messages funded by a
candidate’s own campaign, as compared with those funded by outside groups supporting the
candidate. See id. at 61.
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See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
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In 2015-2016, roughly twice as many SuperPACs registered with the FEC as had registered
during the 2012 election cycle, and they spent $475 million or almost 80% more on the specific
candidates for whom they were formed than in the 2012 cycle. See Soo Rin Kim, Mine, all
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outside groups because, to be able to raise unlimited sums from donors, they cannot coordinate
with their candidate’s campaign.99 Yet, as noted above, SuperPACs often have close ties with
the candidates they support.100 As a consequence of the close ties between candidates and the
single-candidate SuperPACs that support them, commentators caution against treating all these
entities’ expenditures as outside spending.101 Researchers have also found that most outside
groups (whether SuperPACs or not) are actually part of an extended party network and rarely
work to elect a candidate disfavored by the establishment.102
Clearly, not all outside spending fosters corruption or polarization, and not all pressure
applied to candidates by donors (existing or prospective) hijacks candidates’ agendas or prevents
lawmakers from performing their responsibilities properly. Representative government rests on
the premise that responsiveness to constituencies is an important part of the function of those
who hold elected office.103 At the same time, responsiveness to one’s constituencies is not the
equivalent of responsiveness to the highest bidder, nor do the financial requirements for being
elected to public office relieve officials of their responsibility to consider claims of the entire
mine: Single Candidate SuperPACs, creeping down-ballot, Nov. 10, 2016,
https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2016/11/mine-all-mine-single-candidate-super-pacs-creepingdown-ballot. In contrast, in 2011-2012, 75 single-candidate SuperPACs spent $268 million on
independent expenditures. Id.
99
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52 U.S.C. §30116(a)(7)(B).
See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
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See Magleby & Goodliffe, supra note 75, at 90 (distinguishing three types of SuperPACs:
those connected to business or labor groups, political parties, and free-standing ideological
groups). See also Malbin & Glavin, supra note 91, at 23. Cf. id. at 6 (stating that “Super PAC
spending is not as efficient as spending controlled by the candidate’s campaign committee”).
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Robin Kolodny & Diane Dwyre, Congruence or Divergence? Do Parties and Outside Groups
Spend on the Same Candidates, and Does It Matter?, 46 AMER. POLITICS RES. 375 (2018).
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See FEDERALIST PAPERS Nos.52, 57.
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range of their constituents and the public interest.104 The problem posed by the rate of
acceleration of outside group financing of elections during the past decade is that, if left
unchecked, it could prevent a balanced equilibrium from forming among candidates, parties,
citizens, and other actors.
If the rapid growth of outside group spending is a major cause for concern, what can and
should be done? The most immediate reforms that could curtail this trend revolve around
identifying groups that properly should be classified as political committees, although they
currently are not. As described below, this would improve transparency because political
committees are subject to reporting and disclosure rules relating to their own operations and the
identity of their donors. Properly classifying certain nonprofits as political committees could also
reduce the flow of outside money because contributions to such committees are capped at $5,000
per contributor. Most nonprofits that would be eligible for classification as political committees
are exempt from federal income tax as IRC §501(c)(4) social welfare groups.105 Because these
nonprofits are subject to FECA as well as the IRC, and because the rules relating to campaign
activity differ under FECA and the IRC, an organization can qualify as a 501(c)(4) group for IRC
purposes while also being a political committee for FECA purposes. The next two Parts examine
the criteria that determine which politically active groups should be regulated as political
committees under FECA regardless of their classification under the IRC.
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This analysis assumes no particular understanding of the public interest, which may, and
often will, favor the claims of some constituents over those of others. It does, however,
presuppose that the public interest is something independent of the private interests of public
officials, i.e., getting elected, remaining in office, or securing employment upon leaving office.
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Prior to Citizens United, 527 organizations were popular vehicles for outside campaign
financing.
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II. POLITICAL COMMITTEE STATUS AND THE MAJOR PURPOSE DOCTRINE
Most nonprofits exempt under section 501 of the IRC hold the view that they do not
satisfy the criteria triggering FECA political committee status, even when they are politically
active. What constitutes a political committee is contested for several reasons, the most
troublesome of which is what is often called the major purpose rule.
A. The Legal Status of the Major Purpose Requirement
Groups that seek to avoid FECA political committee status usually organize as exempt
organizations under the IRC, either as 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations or as 501(c)(6) trade
associations.106 Classification as political committees depends upon two conditions that trigger
that status. The first condition, which is statutory, is that an entity is a political committee if it
receives contributions or makes expenditures for the purpose of influencing an election for
federal office that total more than $1,000 in a calendar year.107 The second condition, which was
added by the Supreme Court in Buckley, is that a political committee is an entity “the major
purpose of which is the nomination or election of a candidate” or that is “under the control of a

106

Not all 527 groups are required to register with the FEC as political committees. IRC
§501(c)(5) labor organizations and §501(c)(6) trade associations and business leagues also
engage in campaign activities, but the amounts involved are dwarfed by the amounts spent by
501(c)(4) groups. See Political Nonprofits (Dark Money), OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/nonprof_summ.php. For an analysis of political
committee status and related issues as they apply to 527 groups, see Miriam Galston, Emerging
Constitutional Paradigms and Justifications for Campaign Finance Regulation: The Case of 527
Groups, 95 GEORGETOWN L.J. 1181 (2007).
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The definition of political committee in section 30101(4) contains the dollar triggers. The
definitions of “contribution” and “expenditure,” which are part of the definition of political
committee, contain the language “for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office.”
See 52 U.S.C. §§30101(8)(A)(i), 30101(9)(A)(i). On the history of the influencing language, see
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 77.
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candidate.”108
The statutory condition, which is triggered by specific dollar amounts, seems objective
and straightforward. The second condition, in contrast, has generated much discussion among
FEC commissioners, in judicial decisions, and in legal commentary. The definite article “the”
before “major purpose” may be interpreted to imply that, before it can be classified a political
committee, an entity must have nominating or electing a candidate as its sole major purpose i.e.,
that more than half of its resources are devoted to nominating or electing a candidate.
Accordingly, several courts have interpreted Buckley’s condition as meaning “more than half.”
For example, in North Carolina Right to Life v. Leake, the Fourth Circuit adopted this
interpretation based upon the definite article “the” in Buckley and on Buckley’s concern that the
regulatory burdens attached to being a political committee not fall on entities engaged primarily
in discussion of issues.109 In support of its interpretation, the court also cited Supreme Court
cases that use the definite article “the” before the words “major purpose” when referring to a
political committee’s characteristics as well as lower courts that have ruled specifically on the
criteria applicable to political committees.110 For the Fourth Circuit, Buckley’s condition was
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See N.C Right to Life v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 287-89 (4th Cir. 2008), citing Buckley, 424 U.S.
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appellate decisions agreeing with N.C. Right to Life about the meaning of Buckley, see New
Mexico Youth Organized v. Herrera, 611 F.3d 669, 675-79 (10th Cir. 2010); Minn. Citizens
Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 864, 875 n.10 (8th 2012); Colorado Right to Life
Comm. V. Coffman, 498 F.3d 1137, 1151-55 (10th Cir. 2007). See also Wisc. Right to Life v.
Barland, 751 F.3d 804, 839 (7th Cir. 2014).
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See N.C. Right to Life, 525 F.3d at 288. N.C. Right to Life mentions FEC v. Massachusetts
Citizens for Life (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238 (1986), and McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 170 n.64
(2003). For a different view of the passage in MCFL, see HumanLife of Wash., Inc. v.
Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 990, 1010-11 (9th Cir. 2010); Richey v. Tyson, 120 F. Supp. 2d. 1298,
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meant to protect from regulation groups that have influencing elections as “a” major purpose, as
long as such influencing is not their primary purpose, in order to preclude “the regulation of too
much ordinary political speech.”111
In addition to their quantitative interpretation of “the major purpose,”North Carolina
Right to Life and similar decisions rest upon the view that Buckley asserted the major purpose
constraint as a constitutional requirement circumscribing the permissible boundaries of
disclosure regulation for political speech under state as well as federal law.112 For these courts,
which include the Eighth and Tenth Circuits,113 the First Amendment of the Constitution is the
source of the Buckley condition to subject to regulation only groups whose primary purpose is
election related.
In contrast, several appellate courts have concluded that Buckley’s condition was an
interpretation of FECA, the federal campaign finance statute at issue in the case, and not a
constitutional requirement.114 In their view, therefore, the major purpose language does not bind
courts interpreting state law. All of these decisions involved the definition of a political
1311 (S.D. Ala. 2000). District court decisions are listed in N.C. Right to Life, 525 F.3d at 288.
111

See N.C. Right to Life, 525 F.3d at 288-89. Cf. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79 (expressing concern
that without restrictions, regulation “could be interpreted to reach groups engaged purely in issue
discussion”).
112

See N.C. Right to Life, 525 F.3d at 288; Minn. Citizens for Life, 692 F.3d at 872; N.M. Youth
Organized, 611 F.3d at 675-79.
113

See supra note 109. The ruling of the Seventh Circuit in Barland, 751 F.3d 804, is consistent
with these courts. In another case, however, the Seventh Circuit did not adopt the Fourth
Circuit’s interpretation. See infra notes 120-121.
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See Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 758 F.3d 118, 135-36 (2nd Cir. 2014), cert.
denied 135 S. Ct. 949 (2015); Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 487, 490
(7th Cir. 2012); Nat’l Org. For Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 59 (1st Cir. 2011); Montanans for
Cmty. Dev. v. Mangas, 735 Fed. Appx. 280, 284, 285 (9th Cir, 2018) (unpublished op.). See also
Human Life, 624 F.3d at 1009-10, and infra notes 115-116 and accompanying text.
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committee under state law and all concerned the state’s disclosure regulations.
In National Organization for Marriage v. McKee (NOM), for example, the First Circuit
examined Maine’s disclosure rules for “Non-Major-Purpose PACs,” which applied to groups
receiving contributions or spending more than $5,000 "for the purpose of promoting, defeating or
influencing in any way" a candidate in a state election.115 The plaintiff organization challenged
the constitutionality of the state’s disclosure provision based upon Buckley’s major purpose
language. Rejecting that claim, which it said was based upon dictum in Buckley, the First Circuit
asserted that Buckley’s major purpose language reflected the Supreme Court’s “construction of a
federal statute.”116 The NOM court also noted that, were the plaintiff to prevail in its
interpretation of state law, a low-budget group spending $1,500 to elect a candidate would have
to register as a political committee subject to regulation if that amount was more than half of its
expenditures, but a group spending $1,500,000 to defeat the candidate would not be a political
committee if $1,500,000 was less than half of its total expenditures.117 Such an outcome, the
court said, would be “perverse.”118 The outcome would be perverse because the concern of
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NOM, 649 F.3d at 58. For registration and reporting requirements for non-major-purpose
PACs, see id. at 42.
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NOM, 649 F.3d at 59.

117

See NOM, 649 F.3d at 59; see also Richey, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 1310 n.10; Ctr. for Individual
Freedom, 697 F.3d at 489, Vt. Right to Life Comm., 875 F. Supp. 2d at 395; Akins, 101 F.3d 731,
743 (D.C. Cir. 1996), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 524 U.S. 11. See also Yamada v.
Snipes, 786 F.3d 1185, 1200 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting that larges organization could spend “tens or
hundreds of thousands of dollars” on election related activities, while that sum represents only
one percent of their spending).
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NOM, 649 F.3d at 59, citing the district court decision in Nat'l Org. for Marriage v. McKee,
723 F. Supp. 2d 245, 264 (D. Me. 2010). It is unclear whether the court added the example to
indicate that public policy considerations reinforced its constitutional analysis of the Buckley
condition or to explain how it arrived at what Buckley meant.
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Congress and the Buckley Court was to prevent the reality or appearance of corruption, and it is
illogical to view $1,5000 as posing a threat of corruption, while $1,500,000 would not. Since the
disclosure burden under Maine’s law would be significantly less than the federal regulation at
issue in Buckley, and the disclosure rules were substantially related to the state’s important
interest in providing information to enable voters to make informed choices, the court concluded
that the Non-Major-Purpose PAC provision was constitutional.119
The Seventh Circuit also upheld a state law challenged because its disclosure rules treated
groups as political committees, even though their major purpose was not electing or defeating a
candidate for public office. The court observed that the disclosure provisions at issue were much
less burdensome than the burdens involved in Buckley.120 It also emphasized that requiring an
organization to have electing a candidate as its principal purpose would facilitate circumvention
of the law because an election-oriented group could simply increase its non-election activities “or
better yet” merge “with a sympathetic organization that engaged in activities unrelated to
campaigning.”121 The court thus concluded that preventing circumvention, a goal the Supreme
Court has repeatedly endorsed,122 constituted one of the principal reasons for rejecting the narrow
reading of the Buckley condition advanced by the plaintiff.
B. Major Purpose and the Spectrum of Purpose
The First and Seventh Circuits are not alone in construing Buckley’s condition as more
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See NOM, 649 F.3d at 56-58 (applying an exacting scrutiny analysis).
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Ctr. for Individual Freedom, 697 F. 3d at 488.
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Ctr. for Individual Freedom, 697 F. 3d at 489.
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See Nabil Ansari, Note: Judicial Standards for the Anti-Circumvention Rationale in
Campaign Finance, 19 N.Y.U.J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 417 (2016).
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flexible than do the Fourth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits. In HumanLife of Washington, Inc. v.
Brumsickle, the Ninth Circuit agreed that Buckley’s major purpose language did not establish a
bright-line rule precluding treating as political committees groups whose actions to nominate or
elect a candidate for public office were less than half their activities overall, although its
reasoning differs from that of the other appellate courts reaching this conclusion. The case
involved a state law that classified as a political committee a group having as its "primary or one
of the primary purposes" to receive contributions or make expenditures in support of or
opposition to a candidate or ballot proposition.123 In contrast to the preceding courts, HumanLife
construed Buckley’s condition as a constitutional statement about political committees. For this
court, the passage in question in Buckley established two poles of constitutional analysis: groups
engaged in pure issue discussion, which cannot be subjected to campaign finance disclosure
regulations, and groups whose sole major purpose is supporting or defeating candidates, which
can be subject to them.124 According to HumanLife, the validity of regulating everything in
between these poles will depend upon “whether the burdens imposed by the disclosure
requirements are substantially related to the government's important informational interest.”125
For the HumanLife court, this result is dictated not only by the language and logic of Buckley; it
recognizes a “‘fundamental organizational reality’ that most organizations ‘do not have just one
major purpose.’"126
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See HumanLife, 624 F.3d at 997.
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HumanLife, 624 F.3d at 1009-1010.
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HumanLife, 624 F.3d at 1010.
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HumanLife, 624 F.3d at 1011, citing N.C. Right to Life, 525 F.3d at 330 (Michael, J.,
dissenting).
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Although the HumanLife decision concerned state law, the constitutional reasoning
implies that federal campaign finance law can classify as political committees those
organizations whose campaign activity is less than half of their total activity. In fact, in 2001,
when the FEC gave advance notice of a rulemaking that might add a major purpose provision to
the definition of a political committee, it included an alternative consistent with this implication
of HumanLife. Among other proposals it was considering, the FEC included interpreting the
major purpose condition as referring to the goal that occupies the largest part of an organization’s
spending and time, even if it consumes less than half of the group’s spending and time.127 In that
event, an organization could meet the major purpose condition if it spends “30% or 40% of its
total disbursements on election-related activity, while its other disbursements are used for a wide
range of purposes.”128 The FEC also considered the possibility of defining an organization’s
major purpose in terms of a fixed amount of independent expenditures or other election-related
disbursements, e.g., $50,000, regardless of what percentage of an organization’s total spending
the fixed amount would be.129 The goal of that alternative would be to prevent the “perverse”
result, mentioned in some judicial decisions, of allowing groups with large budgets to avoid
political committee status despite spending millions of dollars on express advocacy or other
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See FEC, Definition of Political Committee, 66 Fed. Reg. 13681, 13685 (Mar. 7, 2001)
(Advance notice of proposed rulemaking). The FEC also invited comment on other possible
definitions, including equating major purpose with the goal that consumed more than half of an
organization’s disbursements. Id. See also FEC, Political Committee Status, 69 Fed. Reg.
11736, 11747 (Mar. 11, 2004) (Notice of proposed rulemaking) (inviting comment on using a
25% threshold).
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Committee Status, supra note 127, at 13685. The FEC also considered whether electionrelated activity should be limited to “independent expenditures” under FECA, i.e., public
communications that expressly advocate a candidate’s election or defeat. See id, at 13686.
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See id., at 13685.
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election related communications.130
In 2004, the FEC elaborated on its earlier Notice by mentioning the possibility of
including under the rubric of “political committee” any group that meets the statutory $1,000
contribution or expenditure test and has as “a” major purpose nominating or electing a federal
candidate.131 It clarified that, if it adopted this definition, a group could become a political
committee “if the nomination or election of a candidate or candidates is one of two or more
major purposes of an organization, even if it is not its primary purpose,” and “even when the
organization spends more funds for another purpose.”132 To justify considering this proposal, the
FEC looked to the reason given in Buckley for introducing the major purpose condition in the
first place, namely, to ensure that groups engaged “purely in issue discussion” would not be
classified as political committees, even if they were involved in “incidental” contributions or
expenditures.133 The FEC reasoned that an organization with “a” major purpose of nominating or
electing a candidate for office could not be said to be engaged purely in issue discussion and,
thus, that there would be no inconsistency with Buckley if the agency adopted its “a” major
purpose alternative to define a political committee in its proposed regulation.134 The FEC also
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See Political Committee Status, supra note 127, at 11,744 This NPRM lays out various
alternatives and asks for comments. When the FEC promulgated the final rule, it did not take a
position on any proposals included in the NPRM that were not adopted. See FEC, Political
Committee Status, Definition of Contribution, and Allocation for Separate Segregated Funds and
Nonconnected Committees, 69 Fed. Reg. 68056, 68063-68064 (Nov. 23, 2004).
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Political Committee Status, supra note 127, at 11744. See id. at 11749 (raising the same
issues with specific reference to organizations described in IRC 501(c)).
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Id. at 11744.
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Id.
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cited the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Harriss, which held that the phrase
“principal purpose” in the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act did not limit the application of the
statute to a person’s most important purpose because to do so would “seriously impair the
effectiveness of the Act in coping with the problem it was designed to alleviate.”135 The term
“principal,” the FEC observed in Notice 2004-6, more clearly signifies what is most important
than “major” does, yet the Court in Harriss did not equate “principal” with “most important,”136
much less with more than half. As a result, the FEC considered its suggestion a plausible
interpretation of Buckley’s major purpose condition, even though the agency did not ultimately
adopt that alternative when it finalized the rulemaking.137
In Akins v. FEC, the D.C. Circuit propounded a different interpretation of the Buckley
major purpose condition.138 At issue was whether a large lobbying and public affairs exempt
organization had become a political committee by virtue of its involvement in political
campaigns. In dismissing a complaint brought to compel the FEC to classify the organization a
political committee, the agency had argued that nominating and electing candidates for federal
office did not constitute the organization’s major purpose.139 The appellate court rejected the
FEC’s interpretation of that standard and instead adopted the view that the Buckley major

135

See id. (quoting United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 622-23 (1954).
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See Political Committee Status, 72 Fed. Reg. 5595 (Feb. 7, 2007) (Final rulemaking).
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Akins v. FEC, 101 F.3d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
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See Akins, 101 F.3d at 734. The FEC determined that the organization’s relevant campaign
activities represented “a small portion of its overall activities” and its “campaign activities were
only conducted in support of its lobbying activities.” Id.
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purpose test applied only in connection with a group’s independent expenditures140 and, thus, was
not intended to apply in connection with contributions, i.e., if a group exceeded $1,000 in
political contributions.141 The rationale for this distinction was that “[i]ndependent expenditures
are the most protected form of political speech” because they most resemble “pure issue
discussion” and because of the difficulty in determining when a communication is
independent.142 Since the Akins decision was vacated and remanded on other grounds by the
Supreme Court,143 it is not precedent. Nonetheless, the appellate court’s interpretation of Buckley
is still important because it is based upon a careful reading of both the Buckley language and its
rationale for introducing the major purpose condition, i.e., avoiding intrusive regulation of
groups that engage in campaign activity confined to independent expenditures.
Organizations seeking to avoid political committee status would prefer Buckley’s major
purpose condition to be construed narrowly, i.e., as referring to more than half of a group’s
election-related expenditures, since this interpretation would reduce the likelihood of a group
being classified as a political committee and thus subject to FECA. As the preceding makes
clear, however, neither the FEC nor all courts have adopted that reasoning. On the contrary,
based upon various theories, numerous federal appellate courts and the FEC have concluded that
Buckley’s major purpose constraint is consistent with classifying as political committees groups
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See 52 U.S.C. 13001(17) (entailing express advocacy of election or defeat of a candidate
made without cooperation or consultation with the candidate).
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See Akins, 101 F.3d at 741-42.
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Akins, 101 F.3d at 741.
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FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998). The same reasoning was employed in State of Washington
v. Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n, 195 Wn. 442, 453-54 (2020).
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with considerably less than 51% of their disbursements directed toward elections.
Moreover, several courts and the FEC have considered aspects of a group’s profile other
than expenditures as relevant to political committee status. For example, in Notice 2001-3, the
FEC considered including in the calculation of an organization’s major purpose the percentage of
its time, including that of paid staff and unpaid volunteers, as well as the percentage of its
disbursements.144 The FEC noted that “[v]olunteer activity may become significant in situations
where, for example, an organization spends a small amount of money on election-related activity,
but uses the money to recruit and train volunteers to canvass neighborhoods, run phone banks, or
sponsor other volunteer activity that has a substantial impact on the campaign.”145 Similarly, the
District Court of the District of Columbia recently noted that funding of campaign ads was not
necessarily the “sole relevant factor” in calculating a group’s major purpose, although it did not
specify what additional factors could be included.146 In the same vein, both the FEC and the
courts have considered an organization’s “organizational documents, solicitations, advertising,
other similar documents, public pronouncements, or any other communications” as factors
indicating a group’s major purpose.147
In sum, the courts in several jurisdictions are already open to treating nonprofit
organizations as political committees, even if their election activities are less than their single
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See Political Committee Status, supra note 127, at 13685-13686.
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See id. at 13686. The FEC also noted that, because volunteer activity was excluded from the
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purpose. Id.
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See CREW v. FEC, 299 F. Supp. 3d 83, 100 n.14 (D.D.C. 2018) (CREW II).
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See FEC, supra note 126, at 11745-11746. See also FEC v. GOPAC, 917 F. Supp. 851, 859,
862 (D.D.C. 1996).
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primary purpose, as long as such activity constitutes a major purpose in light of the group’s
mission and totality of its activities. Earlier incarnations of the FEC were similarly receptive.
The obstacle to reclassifying politically active nonprofits, therefore, is not the law, but the
willingness of the FEC to enforce the law as written and interpreted by numerous courts.
It is critical to note that reclassifying politically active nonprofits would not prevent them
from raising substantial amounts of money and being effective participants in elections. In 2016,
for example, corporate PACs gave roughly $182 million to federal candidates and spent roughly
$385 million in election-related disbursements.148 They were able to raise sums of this
magnitude even though limited by law to raising money for their PACs from their shareholders,
executives, and managerial employees.149 Overall, traditional PACs (non-SuperPACs)
contributed $461 million to congressional candidates alone in the 2016 election cycle,150 and they
spent more than $1.4 billion in all in that election cycle.151 Reclassifying politically active
nonprofit organizations would not, then, interfere with their ability to raise large sums of money
and be major players in elections. It would however change their situation in two respects. First,
contributions to political committees are capped at $5000 per election, so they would no longer
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be able to receive unlimited contributions from a single donor. Thus, they would cease to serve
as intermediaries for high wealth individuals and entities seeking to influence elections with
donations of hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars. Second, as noted earlier, as political
committees, nonprofit organizations would be subject to FECA’s reporting and disclosure rules.
Thus, they would no longer serve as vehicles for secret money influencing candidates and
elections.
III. WHAT POLITICAL ACTIVITY COUNTS
Regardless of the version of the major purpose test employed, in order to determine
whether an organization has met the standard, it is necessary to identify which political activities
need to be measured and included. Two areas have generated questions addressed in judicial
decisions.
FECA defines a political committee as “any committee, club, association, or other group
of persons which receives contributions aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year or
which makes expenditures aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year.152 With
certain exceptions, a “contribution” includes “any gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of
money or anything of value made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for
Federal office.”153 Similarly, an “expenditure” includes various kinds of disbursements of value
“for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office” or an agreement make such an
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52 U.S.C. §30101(4)(A). Other groups covered are not relevant here. See 52 U.S.C.
§30101(4)(B), (C).
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expenditure.154 Thus, through the definitions of contribution and expenditure, a political
committee is defined in terms of value received or value disbursed for the purpose of influencing
a federal election.
The phrase “for the purpose of influencing a federal election” was attacked as
unconstitutionally vague in Buckley, and the Supreme Court agreed that its reach had to be
narrowed in order to preclude it being applied to and, thus, chilling engagement in pure issue
discussion. Noting that there was no legislative history to consult for guidance about Congress’s
intention in using that language, Buckley also acknowledged that Congress “wished to promote
full disclosure of campaign-oriented spending to insure both the reality and the appearance of the
purity and openness of the federal election process.”155 The Court concluded that, to avoid
vagueness and protect pure issue discussion, “expenditure” in the disclosure provision at issue
need only be construed to cover certain contributions and “communications that expressly
advocate the election or defeat of a clearly defined candidate.”156 Those who would limit the type
of political activity to express advocacy typically quote this passage in Buckley, which connects
expenditures to express advocacy.157 This has led to a tendency to treat the dichotomy “express
advocacy-issue discussion” as exhausting the permissible constitutional categories for election-
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the political committee definition “dicta”); NOM, 649 F.3d at 59 (same). Buckley also limited
the meaning of “for the purpose of influencing a federal election” to express advocacy for
FECA’s expenditure cap, which it then invalidated anyway. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 43-45.
40

related speech.
This was never an accurate description of Buckley, where the Court described the relevant
major purpose as “the nomination or election of a candidate,” nor does it accord with MCFL’s
characterization in terms of “political activity.”158 Moreover, as noted earlier, in 2002 Congress
added an additional category of election-related communications subject to regulation, called
“electioneering communications,” to target expressions of support for or opposition to candidates
on the eve of an election that fall short of express advocacy.159 In McConnell v. FEC, the Court
upheld this provision160 and it justified expanding the scope of federal campaign finance
regulation to include electioneering communications by stating that the express advocacy passage
in Buckley was an instance of statutory construction, not constitutional interpretation.161 It then
found that the electioneering communication provision satisfied the standards of exacting
scrutiny and, thus, was constitutional.162 In Wisconsin Right to Life, which narrowed the
definition of electioneering communications for some purposes,163 the Court reaffirmed that
express advocacy "does not dictate a constitutional test" and that the "express advocacy
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restriction was an endpoint of statutory interpretation, not a first principle of constitutional
law."164 McConnell also upheld another group of campaign activities added by BCRA, called
“federal election activities,” that is subject to regulation in certain circumstances.165 These
decisions thus clarify that campaign finance regulation may, in certain circumstances, impose
restrictions on election-related speech other than express advocacy. What remains to be clarified,
however, is whether types of political activity other than express advocacy can be counted to
assess whether groups should be classified as political committees.
“Independent expenditures,” which are defined as disbursements made to fund express
advocacy,166 are presumptively counted.167 The courts have split on what additional forms of
election-related activity to include. The stakes are obvious. If the type of campaign activity
considered is narrowly defined to include only express advocacy, a group can devote 100% of its
activities to influencing elections but avoid political committee status by circumscribing the
amount of its express advocacy. The more capacious the definition of campaign activities that
count, in contrast, the greater the likelihood that a group active in elections will qualify as a
political committee subject to FECA reporting, disclosure, and contribution regulations.
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Whether, and how, to classify FECA electioneering communications for purposes of
political committee status was one of the central issues in litigation brought by Citizens for
Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW) against the FEC. In 2012, CREW filed a
complaint with the FEC alleging that American Action Network (AAN) had spent more than $18
million of a total budget of roughly $25 million on express advocacy and electioneering
communications and, thus, it should have registered as a political committee.168 Whether AAN
should have registered depended upon how much, if any, of its electioneering communications
should have counted toward political committee status because only 15 percent of its total budget
was spent on express advocacy.169 Although the FEC’s Office of General Counsel recommended
classifying AAN as a political committee,170 the FEC dismissed CREW’s complaint.171 In
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declining to investigate AAN, the controlling Commissioners172 took the position that none of
AAN’s electioneering communications should be counted in determining if AAN was a political
committee because they were “‘genuine issue advertisements’ unrelated to the election of
candidates.”173 When CREW challenged the FEC’s decision (CREW I), the court rejected the
FEC’s determination and directed the agency to revisit its assessment of AAN’s electioneering
communications with the understanding that communications other than express advocacy could
be counted in determining a group’s major purpose.174 After the remand, the FEC reclassified
some of AAN’s electioneering communications from issue advocacy to campaign ads, but
continued to classify most of them as issue advocacy and again concluded that AAN was not a
political committee. When CREW appealed the FEC’s decision, the court not only again
directed the agency to review its position; it stated in emphatic terms that, based upon the
intention of Congress in enacting BCRA, ads that meet the definition of electioneering
communications are presumptively election oriented and can be considered issue advocacy only
in rare instances (CREW II).175
When the FEC did not comply with the CREW II directive,176 CREW brought suit against
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Because it takes four Commissioners to decide to investigate a complaint, the three who vote
not to investigate are called the controlling Commissioners.
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See CREW I, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 84, 89.
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See CREW I, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 93.
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See CREW II, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 98-101.
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FEC Vice-Chair Ellen L. Weintraub prevented the FEC from dismissing CREW’s claim after
the second remand by preventing the FEC from having a quorum (the FEC only had four
Commissioners at that point). See Statement of Vice-Chair Ellen L. Weintraub regarding CREW
v. FEC & American Action Network (Apr. 19, 2018),
https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/2018-04-19-ELW-statement.pdf.
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the organization itself, asking the court to classify AAN a political committee during the time
period in question and require AAN to register and satisfy the FEC’s reporting requirements,
including disclosing the identities of its large donors during that period (CREW III).177 This
decision did not, however, reach a judgment on the merits of CREW’s claim about AAN’s
status,178 and the litigation is ongoing. Thus, at present, based upon the AAN litigation in CREW
II, the determination of an organization’s political committee status should include electioneering
communications in addition to express advocacy and, further, electioneering communications
should be assumed to count as activity intended to influence the nomination or election of a
candidate unless the organization justifies excluding them on a case-by-case basis.
In addition to the decision in CREW II, two appellate courts interpreting state statutes
have unequivocally ruled in favor of classifying organizations as political committees by taking
into account more than express advocacy. In Vermont Right to Life, the Second Circuit upheld
Maine’s definition of an expenditure as including disbursements for communications that
“support” or “oppose” a candidate for elected office and also validated the use of that definition
for determining if an organization qualified as a political committee.179 The court largely relied
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See CREW III, 410 F. Supp. 3d at 35-36. The first two lawsuits, brought by CREW against
the FEC, were authorized by FECA §39109(a)(8)(A). After the FEC failed to respond to the
court’s directive in CREW II, FECA §30109(a)(8)(C) enabled CREW to bring a citizen suit
directly against the organization it claimed had violated the law. AAN is challenging the
constitutionality of §30109(a)(8)(C). See Notice of Constitutional Challenge, July 13, 2020,
https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?zx=7q56tgq30q56#search/
gleahy%40law.gwu.edu/WhctKJVzXHXRjrfJmwmBPDCgkcVHXNdXgGgNQtsdxGKBpXBhp
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AAN moved to dismiss the lawsuit, saying the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction,
CREW did not have standing, the FEC’s decision was not reviewable because it resulted from an
exercise of the agency’s prosecutorial discretion, and related claims. See CREW III, 410 F. Supp.
3d at 1 (D.D.C. 2019).
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See Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 758 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2014).
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upon McConnell v. FEC to conclude that the support or oppose language in the statute was not
unconstitutionally vague either for the definition of an expenditure or for including in the metric
for determining political committee status.180 Similarly, in Center for Individual Freedom, the
Seventh Circuit upheld Illinois’ definition of a political committee that depended upon a group
accepting contributions or making expenditures “‘on behalf of or in opposition to’ a candidate or
ballot initiative.”181 Also relying on McConnell, the court argued that the terms of the statute
ensure that the transactions triggering political committee status will be “within the core area of
genuinely campaign-related transactions.”182
The First Circuit decision in NOM was more nuanced. In NOM the plaintiff organization
argued that strict scrutiny was required when analyzing political committee status for “non-major
purpose PACs” under Maine law because of the “extensive regulations” that accompany political
committee status.183 The First Circuit disagreed, stating that the regulatory burdens imposed by
Maine on such PACs were light, and it cautioned that the precedents the plaintiff organization
relied upon involved situations where the regulatory burdens on PACs were significantly greater
than those imposed by Maine law.184 Thus, it concluded that exacting scrutiny was appropriate
for analyzing the Maine statutory scheme, and it found the Maine definition of such PACs
constitutional. At the same time, the court noted that Supreme Court precedents consider
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See Vt. Right to Life, 758 F.3d at 128-29, 134-135.
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Ctr. for Individual Freedom, 697 F.3d at 488, 491-98.
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NOM, 649 F.3d at 55-56.
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NOM, 649 F.3d at 56.
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limitations on contributions more restrictive burdens than disclosure rules,185 which may suggest
that the court might have reached a different result if the classification of organizations as
political committees subjected them to contribution restrictions as well as disclosure obligations.
In Wisconsin Right to Life v. Barland,186 the Seventh Circuit examined the relationship
between the type of political advocacy permitted to define an expenditure for purposes of the
electioneering communication disclosure rules and the counterpart question for the definition of a
political committee, and it rejected the conclusion reached by CREW II and other appellate
courts. The court argued that when Citizens United stated that disclosure was a less burdensome
form of regulation than “more comprehensive regulations,” it was referring only to “one time,
event-driven” regulation, i.e., requiring reporting expenditures of a certain kind when they are
made. In contrast, the Seventh Circuit asserted that when the scope of political activity triggers
political committee status, i.e., when the definition of a political committee itself depends upon
the definition of an expenditure, Citizens United’s relaxation of the express advocacy standard no
longer applies. Otherwise, the court argued, a broad interpretation of political advocacy could
chill debate on public issues and cause small groups of activists circulating their positions on
public policies inadvertently to be labeled political committees subject to comprehensive
regulation.187
In sum, the CREW-AAN litigation, which is exactly on point, upheld a broad definition
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NOM, 649 F.3d at 55 (citing Buckley, Citizens United, and Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 196
(2010)).
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Wisc. Right to Life v. Barland, 751 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 2014). For the relevant provision in the
statute, see id. at 812-13.
187

Barland, 751 F.3d at 836-837.
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of election-related activities for purposes of determining political committee status, as did three
appellate courts applying federal campaign finance law to state campaign finance statutes.
Barland, which reached the opposite conclusion, has been called an outlier to the extent that it
limits either the definition of “expenditure” or “political committee” to express advocacy
exclusively.188
Although the precedents thus incline toward a broad definition, the strongest argument for
construing broadly the type of political activity that counts for determining political committee
status is the logic of campaign finance jurisprudence, namely, what as a constitutional matter
needs protection. The considerations set forth in Buckley should guide today’s discourse: pure
issue advocacy should not be subject to regulation, whereas different forms of political
expression can be regulated to varying degrees in accordance with levels of scrutiny appropriate
to the type of speech in question. Buckley and subsequent judicial decisions have all upheld
disclosure and reporting rules and have portrayed the public interests in knowing who is funding
which candidates as paramount.189 In light of these constitutional doctrines and the extraordinary
amounts of money flooding recent elections without the disclosure anticipated by Buckley and its
progeny, it is clear that politically active nonprofits should not be able to evade their disclosure
responsibilities by avoiding political committee status.
Political committee status should, then, rest upon a concept of political activity that
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CREW I, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 90-91. See also Vt. Right to Life, 758 F.3d at 332. Zachary R.
Clark, Constitutional Limits on State Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws: What's the Purpose of
the Major Purpose Test?, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 527, 541 (stating that Barland seems to “back
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See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66, 76; McConnell, 540 U.S. at 196; Citizens United, 558 U.S. at
367.
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reflects what the concept means in ordinary discourse unless there is a compelling reason to
ignore common sense meanings.190 Supporters of a narrow definition of political activity assert
that the First Amendment is such a compelling reason and that it justifies–indeed
requires–keeping the area of unregulated political activity as expansive as possible in order to
secure a realm of expression explicitly protected by the Constitution. This claim is disingenuous
in this context, however, because Congress agreed completely with the First Amendment
argument and, as a result, enacted IRC §527 to afford a privileged position to politically active
exempt organizations. In 1974, concerned about ambiguities in the case law and IRS rulings,
Congress created section 527, which assures tax exemption for politically active groups and
guarantees that contributions to such groups will be exempt from gift tax even though they
exceed the annual gift tax exclusion.191 According to the legislative history, Congress discussed
the relationship between 501(c) organizations and 527 groups, and it expressed the view that the
newly created 527 organization would take “the campaign-type activities ... entirely out of the
section 501(c) organization,” which transformation would be “to the benefit both of the
organization and the administration of the tax laws.”192 In other words, it is unnecessary to
construe narrowly the nature of the political activity that counts in determining if a 501(c)
organization is a political committee based upon First Amendment concerns because Congress

190

The emphatic Buckley doctrine that pure issue advocacy should not be subject to campaign
finance regulation, however many people would see it as political when communicated on the
eve of an election, might be considered such a compelling reason.
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See IRC §527(a), (b)(2), (c)(1), (e)(2) (exempting such groups from tax on income raised and
spent for purposes of influencing elections, although not on investment income); §2501(a)(4)
(exempting the contributions from the gift tax). Prior to that time, contributions in amounts
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S. REP. NO. 93-1357, at 30 (1974).
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itself intended to shift political activity out of 501(c) organizations and into a safe tax code home,
i.e. section 527.
The First Amendment does not guarantee that every nonprofit organization will be able to
exercise its full right to political expression under the aegis of every section of the IRC. For
example, the Supreme Court upheld the IRC’s denial of business expense treatment for the costs
of lobbying or political activity, even though those costs otherwise would qualify as ordinary and
necessary business expenses.193 It also upheld the IRC’s limitations on 501(c)(3) organizations
that prevent them from engaging in more than an insubstantial amount of lobbying.194
Organizations can both obtain exempt status and engage in unlimited political activity by
organizing as 527 groups. The main, perhaps the only, reason that 501(c) groups resist locating
their political activities in a 527 entity195 is that 527 groups are subject to disclosure rules that
501 groups can avoid, namely, reporting the identities of their contributors and the amounts of
their contributions. Thus, the desire to avoid disclosure, and not First Amendment concerns, is
the impetus for arguing that political committee status depends upon express advocacy rather
than a broader concept of political activity adopted by most courts.
IV. DONOR DISCLOSURE
Parts II-III presented the legal grounds for classifying many politically active 501(c)
groups as political committees, in contrast to their current status. This classification is important
because one of the most damaging aspects of current campaign finance practices is the unlimited
193

See Cammarano v. U.S., 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
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See Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
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Section 501(c) groups can do this by setting up a separate segregated account via
bookkeeping entries. See https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/registering-ssf/.
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amounts of money that can be contributed to certain independent-expenditure groups coupled
with the ability of those groups to avoid disclosing the sources of their funds. For example, a
watchdog group found that from 2008-2015, 41 donors each gave between $1 million and $165
million to politically active 501(c) groups.196 SuperPACs, in contrast, are required to disclose
their contributors, although the names of entities, which account for roughly one-third of the $1.5
billion contributed to SuperPACs in 2015-2016 alone, can be unrevealing or misleading.197
Individual donors to entities with unrevealing or misleading names are also undisclosed, unless
revealed by enterprising journalists or watchdog groups.198
If politically active groups that resemble political committees, but are not currently
classified as such, were reclassified as political committees, they would be required to report the
identities of donors who contribute more than $200 during a calendar year.199 This Part considers
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See Political Nonprofits: Top Donors, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/nonprof_donors.php. Since these nonprofits are not
required to disclose their donors, the watchdog’s list, based upon cross-referencing tax returns, is
likely incomplete.
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See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 128 (giving examples like “Citizens for Better Medicare,” an
association of drug manufacturers); 41 annoyingly ridiculous super PAC names, THE WEEK
(Apr. 20, 2012) (listing three groups that include “Americans for A Better Tomorrow” in their
title),
https://theweek.com/articles/476236/41-annoyingly-ridiculous-super-pac-names; Fredreka
Schouten, Behind Fuzzy Names, USA TODAY (Feb. 11, 2014) (stating that Americans for
Progressive Action never backed a liberal Democratic candidate),
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disclosure regulations that apply to disbursements even when the FEC fails to classify such
groups as political committees and that also apply to tax-exempt groups not required to be
classified as political committees because they engage in lesser amounts of political activity.200
The donor disclosure rules for independent expenditures are different from those for
electioneering communications. For groups making independent expenditures, there are three
relevant FECA sections. Section 30104(c)(1) provides that
Every person (other than a political committee) who makes independent expenditures in
an aggregate amount or value in excess of $250 during a calendar year shall file a
statement containing the information required under subsection (b)(3)(A) for all
contributions received by such person.201
Section 30104(b)(3)(A), in turn, requires identification of each contributor of more than $200 in
aggregate in a calendar year to a reporting entity as well as the date and amount of the
contributions.202 Taken together, these two sections appear to require disclosure of every donor
of more than $200 in a calendar year to a nonprofit group, such as a 501(c)(4), that spends more
than $250 on independent expenditures during that period, regardless of whether the donor
intended to fund the political activity of the group. For 501(c)(4) groups, which are required by
the IRC to be engaged primarily in social welfare, this interpretation of the two provisions would
appear to require disclosing every donor of $251 or more, even if the donor contributed to fund
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See FEC, Political Committee Status, supra note 126, at 11749, 11750, 11755; CREW v.
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the group’s efforts to strengthen its social welfare mission rather than its political activity.
However, the definition of “contribution” narrows the reach of these sections because it
states that a contribution is a transfer of value (by money, loan, or anything else) “for the purpose
of influencing any election for Federal office.”203 The influencing language is not defined in
FECA, but in Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court construed this language in the definition of a
contribution to include “funds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee
either directly or indirectly through an intermediary” as well as “dollars given to another person
or organization that are earmarked for political purposes.”204 FECA also does not define “for
political purposes.” Quoting from the legislative history, the Buckley Court noted that Congress
had intended
to achieve "total disclosure" by reaching "every kind of political activity"
in order to insure that the voters are fully informed and to achieve through
publicity the maximum deterrence to corruption and undue influence possible.205
Based upon Buckley, then, a contribution only includes amounts given to a candidate,
political party, or campaign (directly or through an intermediary) or amounts earmarked for
“every kind of political activity.”
Neither FECA nor the regulations specify how earmarking is to be determined when
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donors give to entities making independent expenditures. They do, however, address earmarking
when contributions are made to an entity that will then make contributions to a candidate.
According to FECA, a contribution that is
made by a person, either directly or indirectly, on behalf of a particular candidate,
including contributions which are in any way earmarked or otherwise directed through an
intermediary or conduit to such candidate, shall be treated as a contribution from such
person to such candidate.206
The related regulations explain that, in this context,
earmarked means a designation, instruction, or encumbrance, whether direct or indirect,
express or implied, oral or written, which results in all or any part of a contribution or
expenditure being made to, or expended on behalf of, a clearly identified candidate or a
candidate’s authorized committee.207
The consequence of such earmarking is that the immediate recipient is considered an
“intermediary or conduit”’ that must report to the FEC both the identity of the source and the
beneficiary candidate to whom the contribution is forwarded.208 Thus, although there are no
statutory or regulatory explanations of earmarking in the context of contributions to independentexpenditure organizations, the provisions quoted make clear that the idea of earmarking extends
far beyond an express request by a donor to an organization to use all or part of a contribution for
independent expenditures. Based upon the above regulation section, an implicit understanding
between parties would constitute earmarking, as would an indirect expression of intent that the
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contributor’s money be used by the recipient organization for such purposes. Some
commentators have argued that earmarking occurs “[w]here donors ‘know,’ directly or indirectly,
that their dollars will be spent on political activity.”209 This would occur, for example, if a 501(c)
organization that is not a political committee solicits contributions with the understanding that
the money will be used for independent expenditures. In such situations, both donor and
recipient organization would also violate the law prohibiting “straw donors,” i.e., one party
making “contributions in the name of another person.”210
The third statutory provision related to donor disclosure in connection with independent
expenditures is section 30104(c)(2), which provides for the identification of those who contribute
more than $200 to groups making independent expenditures if the contribution was made “for the
purpose of furthering the independent expenditure.”211 This provision is more limited than (c)(1)
in that it requires that a subset of the donors disclosed under (c)(1) be further identified if they
intended to fund the independent expenditure, rather than simply earmarking their contribution
for a political purpose.212
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See Contributions to Politically Active Outside Groups: Risk Areas and Advice for Donors,
COVINGTON ELECTION AND POLITICAL LAW 2 (Oct. 9, 2018) (asserting that in such cases, the
recipient organization exposes itself to enforcement actions, especially under state laws).
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420-28.
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To implement these three statutory provisions concerning donor disclosure to entities
making independent expenditures, the FEC promulgated section 109.10(e)(1)(vi). That
regulation provides that the non-political committee reporting its own independent expenditures
must disclose the identity of each donor whose “contribution was made for the purpose of
furthering the reported independent expenditure” (emphasis added). This is the sole FEC
regulation implementing all three statutory sections just described. That the reach of the
regulation appears to be less than the reach of (c)(2) and is markedly narrower than (c)(1) was
noted by the FEC’s Office of General Counsel.213 Because of the discrepancy, which enables
organizations making independent expenditures to argue they lack the obligation to disclose most
or all of their donors, a watchdog group challenged the legality of the regulation, first at the FEC
and subsequently in court.
In Citizens for the Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. FEC (CREW-CGPS), the
court held that section 109.10(e)(1)(vi) was invalid.214 The court found that, by not promulgating
a regulation reflecting subsection 30104(c)(1)’s requirement of disclosure of “all” contributions
received by a group making independent expenditures, the FEC had “read[...] subsection (c)(1)
out of the statute.”215 The FEC then issued guidance that, to comply with section 30104(c)(1),
213

See CREW v. FEC, 316 F. Supp. 3d 349, 361-63 (D.D.C.2018) (CREW-CGPS). Perhaps the
FEC’s failure to implement (c)(1) went unnoticed because in 1980, corporations were not
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Potter & Morgan, supra note 4, at 427.
214
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CGPS sought unsuccessfully to stay enforcement of the district court’s vacatur until its appeal
on the merits was decided. See CREW v. FEC, 904 F.3d 1014 (D.C. Cir. 2018), CGPS v.
CREW, 139 S. Ct. 50 (2018). In August of 2020, the lower court decision was affirmed. CREW
v. FEC, ___ F.3d ___ (D.C. Cir. 2020).
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requires entities making an independent expenditure greater than $250 to report the identities of
all persons making contributions to it greater than $200 “earmarked for a political purpose”
“intended to influence elections.”216 To comply with §30104(c)(2), the FEC guidance also
requires such entities to further identify those who made contributions greater than $200 for any
independent expenditure.217
Commentators have criticized the FEC’s guidance for lacking clarity218 or for enabling
organizations making substantial amounts of independent expenditures to claim that none of their
contributors intended their contributions to support those expenditures.219 And, in fact, even
nonprofits making large amounts of independent expenditures have usually disclosed few if any
contributors, either asserting in their filings that they have received no contributions made for
political purposes, listing no names and offering no explanation, or listing the names of other
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Remain Dark, CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR. (Oct. 17, 2018) (detailing CLC’s findings about groups
making independent expenditures, but not listing any contributors that gave money for political
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organizations as donors so that the ultimate individual donors are not identified.220 Although it is
impossible to quantify the donors shielded in this way, it is estimated that fully- or partially
nondisclosing groups have spent close to a billion dollars on political advertising since 2010.221
The situation is different for organizations such as nonprofits that spend money on
electioneering communications.222 The disclosure provision for electioneering communications,
introduced by BCRA in 2002, mandates disclosure by entities that make expenditures in excess
of $10,000 for electioneering communications and disclosure of the identities of their donors; the
provision does not, however, require a showing that the expenditures were intended to influence
the election of a candidate for federal elective office.223 The initial FEC regulation tracked the
statute,224 so that disclosure of donors was required whenever an organization funded
communications meeting the definition of “electioneering communications.” In 2007, however,
after the Supreme Court decided Wisconsin Right to Life,225 and even though the Court left intact
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the definition in FECA for disclosure purposes, the FEC requested comment on possible
revisions to the regulation that would add an intent element to the conditions for identifying
donors.226 It then promulgated a regulation requiring corporations and unions making
independent expenditures to identify their donors only if the amounts donated aggregate $1000 or
more and are “made for the purpose of furthering electioneering communications.”227
Then-Congressman Chris Van Hollen challenged the revised regulation’s purpose
requirement as inconsistent with the text of the underlying statute.228 Although the district court
agreed with him and invalidated the rule,229 on appeal the D.C. Circuit reversed that decision and
upheld the regulation.230 The appellate court found that the regulation represented a permissible
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See FEC, Electioneering Communications, 72 Fed. Reg. 50,261 (Aug. 31, 2007). According
to an appellate court, the FEC believed this reconsideration was necessitated by Wisconsin Right
to Life, which made commercial corporations and unions subject to disclosure–something that
Congress had not contemplated when enacting BCRA. See Van Hollen v. FEC, 811 F.3d 486,
490-91 (D.C. Cir. 2016). For background, see Potter and Morgan, supra note 4, at 446-55
(detailing events leading the FEC to change its rule and arguing that Congress “did in fact
anticipate that the electioneering disclosure requirements could be applied” to such corporations
and unions). See id. at 451.
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See 11 C.F.R. §104.20(c)(9) (stating that this rule applies if the reporting entity is a
corporation or a union). If the reporting entity is not a corporation or a union, the earlier rule
applies, which required identifying all donors of $1000 or more in the relevant time frame
regardless of intent. See 11 C.F.R. §104.20(c)(8). Different disclosure rules apply if the
donations are made to a separate bank account established by the reporting entity to fund
electioneering communications. See 11 C.F.R. §104.20(c)(7).
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See Van Hollen v. FEC, 851 F. Supp. 2d 69 (D.D.C. 2012).
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The FEC did not appeal the Van Hollen decision, probably because it lacked four votes to
appeal. Instead, the intervener appealed and the D.C. Circuit reversed, sending the case back to
the FEC to explain or revise its regulation. See Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Van Hollen, 694
F.3d 108 (D.C.Cir. 2012). When the FEC did not act, the court again invalidated the regulation.
See Van Hollen v. FEC, 74 F. Supp. 3d 407 (D.D.C. 2014).
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See Van Hollen v FEC, 811 F.3d 486, 489-90 (D.C. Cir 2016), reversing 74 F. Supp. 3d 407
(D.D.C. 2014).
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exercise of agency discretion under Chevron.231 Although a rehearing en banc was requested,
and denied,232 the appellate decision was not appealed.
No other court has yet ruled on the validity of this FEC regulation. Six months before the
D.C. Circuit’s Van Hollen decision, in Delaware Strong Families, the Third Circuit examined a
state law that largely tracked FECA’s electioneering communication disclosure provision.233
Employing exacting scrutiny, the court concluded that there was a substantial relationship
between the state’s interest in an informed electorate and the type of disclosure required by the
law.234 The court expressly rejected the plaintiff organization’s claim that the reasoning of
Citizens United requires donors to be disclosed only if they earmarked their contributions for
electioneering communications.235 The Supreme Court denied certiorari,236 leaving the Third
Circuit’s holding intact. Although Van Hollen had been handed down six months earlier, Justice
Thomas’ dissent, which was the only opinion in the denial of certiorari, does not mention that
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See Van Hollen, 811 F.3d 486.

232

See Van Hollen v. FEC, 811 F.3d 486, reh’g en banc denied, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 17528
(D.C. Cir. Sept. 26, 2016). For criticism of the composition of the panel, see Rick Hasen,
Appeals Court Panel Overturns Van Hollen v. FEC, Reopening Massive Disclosure Loophole for
2016 Cycle, ELECTION LAW BLOG (Jan. 21, 2016), cited in Stephen R. Klein, "The Centre
Cannot Hold": Campaign Finance Disclosure Beyond 2016, 56 WASHBURN L.J. 93, 104 (2017).
233

See Del. Strong Families v. Att’y Gen. of Delaware, 793 F.3d 304 (3rd Cir. 2015), cert. denied
sub nom. Del. Strong Families v. Denn, 136 S. Ct. 2376 (2016). The Delaware provision
covered a wider range of media, e.g., radio, newspapers and other periodicals, signs, the internet,
mail, and the telephone. Id. at 311.
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See Del. Strong Families, 793 F.3d at 312, see id. at 309-310.
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See Del. Strong Families, 793 F.3d at 311-12. When this decision was rendered, the Van
Hollen decision invalidating the FEC’s regulation had not yet been reversed. However, the Third
Circuit appears to have relied on its exacting scrutiny reasoning, not on the earlier Van Hollen
case. See id. at 311-12.
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See Del. Strong Families, supra note 233 (of the eight Justices deciding the case, Justice
Alito would have granted certiorari and Justice Thomas wrote a dissent).
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decision, arguing instead that transparency should sometimes yield to First Amendment values
and that the requirements of the Delaware disclosure provisions were unnecessarily broad and
burdensome.237
Based upon the preceding, prospects for disclosure by entities that are not political
committees are uncertain. In the case of independent expenditures, although courts invalidated
the FEC’s regulation that practically assured donors would not be disclosed, the FEC’s
subsequent guidance enabled groups to avoid disclosing donors. In the case of electioneering
communications, the decision by the D.C. Circuit upheld the FEC’s interpretation of FECA
requiring intent by donors to fund political activity before disclosure is required. This is the
definitive interpretation of FECA’s electioneering communication disclosure provision unless
and until a different Circuit Court reaches a contrary conclusion, yet there is some uncertainty
here as well because the Supreme Court denied certiorari in a case invalidating an interpretation
similar to the D.C. Circuit’s for a state law mirroring the FECA provision.238 The denial of
certiorari is not precedential, although it did leave the state law in effect. The fragmentary
evidence detailed in this Part thus suggests that, for now, if there is to be action supporting
disclosure for politically active groups not classified as political committees, it likely will come
from state rather than federal law.
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See Del. Strong Families, 136 S. Ct. at 2376.
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See supra notes 232-235 and accompanying text.
61

V. FEC ENFORCEMENT
The Federal Election Commission (FEC) is entrusted with enforcing federal campaign
finance law.239 It has six Commissioners, and by law, no political party can be represented by
more than three Commissioners.240 The rationale for this limitation is to ensure that any agency
action will reflect some degree of bipartisan support.241 Although legislating an equal number of
Commissioners from each party,242 and also requiring four votes for official actions, might seem
like a recipe for deadlock, in point of fact, until roughly fifteen years ago, there was an extremely
low rate of deadlock in important substantive matters.243
In the last decade, however, there has been an increase in instances of Commission
deadlock. Deadlock has occurred at every level of their decisionmaking. For example, after a
complaint is filed about an individual or group that may have violated federal election laws,244 at
least four Commissioners have to vote to begin an investigation into whether the facts are as
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See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. 93-443, §310, 52 U.S.C.
§§30106 et seq.
240

See 52 U.S.C. §30106(a)(1).
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See Deadlocked Votes Among Members of the Federal Election Commission (FEC):
Overview and Potential Considerations for Congress (Summary), CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE R40779 (Oct. 6, 2009); Scott E. Thomas and Jeffrey H. Bowman, Obstacles to Effective
Enforcement of the Federal Election Campaign Act, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 575, 590 (2000).
242

The statutory requirement prevents more than three Commissioners from one party.
Occasionally Commissioners are Independents, e.g., Steven T. Walther, currently on the
Commission.
243

See Office of Commissioner Ann M. Ravel, FEC, Dysfunction and Deadlock: The
Enforcement Crisis at the Federal Election Commission Reveals the Unlikelihood of Draining
the Swamp 7-12 (Feb. 2017). Early in its history, the FEC was sometimes attacked for being too
active in enforcing campaign finance laws. See Lauren Eber, Note: Waiting for Watergate: The
Long Road to FEC Reform, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1167-68 (2006).
244

Complaints are frequently filed by nonpartisan watchdog groups and partisan members of the
public opposed to the activities of the organization that is the subject of the complaint.
62

alleged.245 This is the same number of Commissioners as are needed to approve a formal
rulemaking, issue an advisory opinion, enter into a conciliation agreement, or conclude whether a
violation of FECA actually occurred.246 As a result, many complaints are dismissed prior to fact
finding because only three votes exist to pursue an investigation. In such cases, the Commission
“will not even ask questions and may not get to the bottom of some very serious allegations.”247
Deadlocks about starting an investigation occur even when the Office of General Counsel
informs the Commissioners that there is reason to believe an investigation should be
undertaken.248
In a scathing report, then-Commissioner Ann Ravel stated that in 2016 the FEC
deadlocked in 30% of their substantive votes, as compared with 4.2% in counterpart situations in
2006.249 She argues that an “anti-enforcement bloc” “has shut down the Commission’s ability to
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See 52 U.S.C. §30109(a)(2).
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See FEC Enforcement Process and Issues for Congress, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE 9 (Dec. 22, 2015).
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Thomas & Bowman, supra note 241, at 592.
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See, e.g., FEC, Summary, MUR 7286 (Indivisible Kentucky, Inc.) (2018),
https://www.fec.gov/data/legal/matter-under-review/7286/; FEC, Summary, MUR 6589 (Am.
Action Network) (2016), https://www.fec.gov/data/legal/matter-under-review/6589/; FEC,
Summary, MUR 6487 (F8, LLC, et al.) (2016),
https://www.fec.gov/data/legal/matter-under-review/6487/; FEC, Summary, MUR 6002
(Freedom’s Watch, Inc.) (2010),
https://www.fec.gov/data/legal/matter-under-review/6002/; FEC, Summary, MUR 5993 (I’m for
Ohio) (May 2009), https://www.fec.gov/data/legal/matter-under-review/5993/; FEC, Summary,
MUR 5694 (Americans for Job Security, Inc.) (2009),
https://www.fec.gov/data/legal/matter-under-review/5694/.
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See Dysfunction and Deadlock, supra note 243, at 1, 3, 7-8. The Report also describes
similar findings by the Congressional Research Service and Public Citizen. Id. at 8. For the
meaning of a “substantive vote,” see Deadlocked Votes, supra note 240.
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investigate even serious allegations in sworn complaints.”250 Experts disagree about the origin
of the current dysfunction.251 Certainly, by 2009, several highly publicized and “acrimonious”
disagreements led Commissioners to level charges of bad faith or worse against fellow
Commissioners in their “Statements of Reasons” for recommending that an enforcement action
be pursued or dismissed.252 Legislation has repeatedly been introduced, often on a bipartisan
basis, to restructure the FEC in the hopes of creating a more effective agency to regulate and
enforce federal campaign finance laws.253 In the face of a dysfunctional agency, numerous
commentators have also made proposals to reform the FEC.254
The FEC may also have been hampered by inadequate resources. Between 2017 and
2020, the FEC experienced a net loss of 38 full-time employees, a roughly 10% reduction.255
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See Dysfunction and Deadlock, supra note 243, at 7 (arguing the bloc applied a more
stringent standard of proof than is required, even to the initial decision to begin an investigation).
See also FEC, Statement of Policy Regarding Commission Action in Matters at the Initial Stage
in the Enforcement Process, 72 Fed. Reg. 12545 (Mar. 16, 2007).
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See Dysfunction and Deadlock, supra note 243, at 8; Richard L. Hasen, The FEC Is As Good
As Dead; The new Republican commissioners are gutting campaign finance law, SLATE (Jan. 25,
2011) (dating it to the two-year fight over confirming Hans von Spakovsky as a commissioner
and the eventual appointment of Donald McGahn, an outspoken critic of campaign finance laws).
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See Deadlocked Votes, supra note 240, at 3.
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See Federal Election Administration Act of 2009, S.1648 (Aug. 7, 2009); Restoring Integrity
to America's Elections Act, H.R.2931, 114th Cong. (2015). Restoring Integrity to America’s
Elections Act, H.R.2034, 115th Cong. (2017); Restoring Integrity to America’s Elections Act,
H.R. 1272, 116th Cong. (2019). See also We the People Act of 2017, H.R.3537, 115th Cong.
(2017) (proposing to abolish the FEC and create a new agency instead).
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See Note: Eliminating the FEC: The Best Hope for Campaign Finance Regulation?, 131
HARV. L. REV. 1421 (2018) (recommending elimination of the FEC and arguing that other
entities could prevent “chaos and disorder” from ensuing); Daniel I. Weiner, Fixing the FEC: An
Agenda for Reform, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE (2019),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_Fixing_FEC.pdf.
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See FEC, Fiscal Year 2020 Congressional Budget Justification 13 (Mar. 18, 2019) (stating
that FY 2020 would see a “total decrease of 38 FTEs”).
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More importantly, between 2010 and 2021, the FEC lost 30% of the staff in its enforcement
division.256 This loss coincided with a growing enforcement case load.257 As a result, the FEC
has dismissed well-documented complaints for reasons of “prosecutorial discretion,” asserting it
was prudent not to pursue those cases because of its limited resources and other priorities.258 In
general, the agency’s exercise of prosecutorial discretion regarding enforcement is unreviewable
by a court, although if based upon an interpretation of law, rather than practical considerations,
the decision is reviewable.259
Whatever the source of the current tendency to deadlock on important substantive issues,
the ramifications for campaign finance enforcement have been profound. A former FEC
Commissioner observed, “[t]he deadlock in recent years not only means that those who have
already violated the law are not penalized, but sends a signal that others can push the legal
envelope with little fear of recourse.”260 In addition, as noted earlier, even when a court rebukes
the FEC for an interpretation or action being “contrary to law” and directs it to withdraw a
regulation, the FEC may continue to thwart the purposes of the statute (and the court) by
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See Courtney Bublé, Election Agency Commissioner: ‘The Biggest Story at the FEC Is
What’s Not Happening, GOVEXECDAILY (Feb. 20, 2021) (citing testimony by Commissioner
Ellen Weintraub to Committee on House Administration, May 2019).
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See Bublé, supra note 255.

258

See CREW v. FEC (CREW-CHGO), 892 F.3d 434, 439 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 2018); id at 438
(prosecutorial discretion can be exercised by administrative agencies).
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CREW-CHGO, 892 F.3d at 438; CREW v. AAN, 415 F. Supp. 3d 143, 146-47 (2019).
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Trevor Potter, Money, Politics, and the Crippling of the FEC: A Symposium on the Federal
Election Commission's Arguable Inability to Effectively Regulate Money in American Elections,
69 ADMIN. L. REV. 447, 450 (2017).
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continuing to issue guidance that permits evasion of disclosure.261
For nine months in 2019-20, the FEC’s enforcement function was further undermined by
the lack of a quorum.262 There is now a quorum, but no nominees for the two remaining seats
have yet been identified.263 It remains to be seen whether the current Commissioners–two
Republicans, one Democrat, and one Independent–can cooperate regarding the agency’s work in
the present polarized political climate.
What is needed is for the FEC to commit to enforcing FEC v+-A and the regulations as
written. This article has reviewed two major areas where existing statutory and regulatory
provisions support far more extensive enforcement than has occurred in the past decade. Parts IIIII demonstrated the legal grounds for classifying as political committees tax-exempt
organizations engaged in extensive campaign activity, such as electioneering communications,
activities that support or oppose candidates for public office, and contributions to groups that
engage in electoral activities. There is also precedent for counting what groups tell their donors
when soliciting funds to determine if electoral activity is in fact their major purpose.264
Additionally, the FEC should scrutinize politically active groups that accomplish their social
welfare purpose largely by lobbying since, when it is to their advantage, they have asked the IRS
to classify their lobbying and issue advocacy as political activity because these are undertaken to
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See supra notes 216-219 and accompanying text.

262

See Federal Election Commission: Membership and Policymaking Quorum, In Brief,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 1 (June 24, 2020). There were four Commissioners
between 2017 and August 2019.
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Membership and Policymaking Quorum, supra note 262, at 2.
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Supra note 166 and accompanying text.
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further the groups’ electoral agenda.265 In short, current law permits the FEC to take a holistic
approach in classifying groups as political committees.
Second, as detailed in Part IV, existing law supports requiring greater disclosure of
donors than the FEC currently requires. Judicial decisions have directed the FEC to implement
the literal terms of FECA 30104(c)(1), which could greatly enlarge the groups required to
identify their donors.266 However, politically active nonprofits have mixed purposes because by
law, their campaign activity cannot be their primary purpose. This has enabled them to deny that
any of their donors have political purposes. To avoid needing to determine the motives of
donors, the FEC could institute a rebuttable presumption that the same percentage of each
contribution has an electoral purpose as the percentage of the nonprofit’s spending on
independent expenditures has to its total spending.267 Further, under existing law the FEC should
enforce FECA’s “straw donor” provision that requires organizations to disclose the identities of
the ultimate donors, when the immediate donors are entities with names that mask the names of
their supporters.268
In brief, even without new legislation or judicial decisions, the FEC has at its disposal
numerous avenues for reducing some of the excesses of outside group campaign financing. Its
current inaction not only reflects, it also reinforces the dysfunction of the electoral system it is
sworn to protect.
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See PLRs 199925051, 9808037, 9725036.
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See supra notes 213-214.
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For a somewhat similar strategy used to quantify the lobbying or campaigning component of
dues paid to certain nonprofits that lobby or campaign, see IRC §§ 162(e), 6033(e)(1)(A).
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See supra note 210.
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VI. IRS ENFORCEMENT
A. What Is a Social Welfare Organization?
In the last two decades, certain nonprofit groups that qualify as IRC exempt organizations
have become increasingly active politically. The most prominent of these are social welfare
organizations269 exempt from federal income tax under section 501(c)(4).270 Although the statute
requires that they be “operated exclusively for social welfare,” the implementing Treasury
regulation states that “an organization is operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare
if it is primarily engaged in promoting in some way the common good and general welfare of the
people of the community.”271 The term “social welfare” is not further defined in the statute or
regulations, but the regulations state that social welfare does not include participation in a
political campaign for or against a candidate for public office, social or recreational activities, or
carrying on a business in a manner similar to a for-profit organization.272
The affirmative requirement for a social welfare organization is thus very general, i.e.,
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The exemption is for “civic leagues or organizations not organized for profit but operated
exclusively for the promotion of social welfare,” or certain associations of employees not
relevant here. 26 U.S.C. §501(c)(4).
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Most 501(c)(4) groups are not politically active. The relatively small number spending large
amounts of money on political campaigns are responsible for the sector’s reputation. See Jeremy
Koulish, From Camps to Campaign Funds: History, Anatomy, and Activities of 501(c)(4)
Organizations, URBAN INST. 26-27 (2016). In 2019, there were roughly 80,000 501(c)(4) groups
filing with the IRS. See IRS, Statistics of Income Tax Stats: Tax-Exempt Organizations and
Non-Exempt Charitable Trusts (Table 14),
https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-tax-exempt-organizations-and-nonexempt-charitable-t
rusts-irs-data-book-table-14. These numbers do not reflect smaller 501(c)(4) groups not required
to file annual returns because their gross receipts are less than $50,000.
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26 C.F.R. §1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i).
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See 26 C.F.R. §1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii).
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promoting some kind of community benefit or public good.273 The activities and goals of social
welfare organizations sometimes resemble those of 501(c)(3) charities,274 but if an organization
desires to lobby more than the insubstantial amount permitted to a charity,275 it often organizes as
a 501(c)(4) group or establishes a 501(c)(4) affiliate for its lobbying.276 An IRS ruling states that
a social welfare group can have lobbying to achieve its social welfare goal as its principal or sole
purpose.277 Thus, because 501(c)(4)s can engage in some political campaign activity,278 they can
be social welfare groups in good standing while devoting most of their activity to lobbying (for
their social welfare mission) and some to campaign activity. For example, an environmental
group would likely qualify as pursuing a 501(c)(4) community benefit if it spends 80% of its
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In the words of an IRS instruction manual, “‘social welfare’ is inherently an abstruse concept
that continues to defy precise definition.” IRS, Social Wefare: What Does It Mean? How Much
Private Benefit Is Permissible? What Is A Community?, EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING
PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION (CPE) TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1981
(1981 IRS CPE TEXT) 39 (1981). See Flat Top Lake Ass’n v. U.S., 868 F.2d 108 (4th Cir. 1989)
(stating that the regulation merely substitutes one amorphous term (i.e., "community") for
another ("social welfare")”); Daniel Halperin, The Tax Exemption under I.R.C. §501(c)(4), 21
NYU J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 519, 525-28 (2014). For examples of a community benefit, see
John Francis Reilly, Carter C. Hull, & Barbara A. Braig Allen, IRC 501(c)(4) Organizations,
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION (CPE) TECHNICAL
INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003 (2003 IRS CPE TEXT), I-4 to
I-11 (2003), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopici03.pdf.
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MICH. L. REV. 508, 512-14 (1983).
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This structure was blessed by the Court in Regan v. Taxation with Representation of
Washington, 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
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Lobbying in pursuit of a group’s social welfare purpose is part of the group’s social welfare
activities. Rev. Rul. 71-530, 1971-2 Cum.Bull. 237.
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See Rev. Rul. 81-95, 1981-1 Cum.Bull. 332 (stating that 501(c)(4)s can engage in campaign
activity as long as they are primarily engaged in social welfare).
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activities on lobbying legislators on environmental issues, 10% on campaigning for candidates
committed to a green agenda, and 10% percent on administration. The group would qualify as a
social welfare organization, although to the public, it might appear to be a political organization.
B. The “Primarily” Standard
A frequently contested aspect of the criteria for 501(c)(4) status is the statement in the
regulations that a group can qualify “as operating exclusively for the promotion of social welfare
if it is primarily engaged in promoting in some way the common good and general welfare of the
people of the community.”279 Since the underlying statute says “exclusively” rather than
“primarily,” and the IRS has not published formal guidance that quantifies or elaborates the
primarily standard introduced in the regulations, commentators have advanced a wide variety of
interpretations. These interpretations include requiring a 501(c)(4) group’s social welfare
activities to be 100% of its overall activities, 60% of its activities, 51% of its activities, or all but
an “insubstantial” portion of its activities.280 Some practitioners adopt the most lenient
interpretation, i.e, that as long as 51% of a group’s activities promote social welfare, it satisfies
the primarily requirement of the 501(c)(4) regulations.281
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26 C.F.R. §1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i).
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See ABA Section of Taxation, Comments on Proposed Regulations regarding Guidance for
Tax-Exempt Social Welfare Organizations on Candidate-Related Political Activities 10-12 (May
7, 2014) (2014 ABA Comments). The Section of Taxation did not reach a consensus about the
proper standard. Id. at 11. An earlier task force of the Exempt Organizations Committee of the
Section of Taxation recommended at least 60% of a 501(c)(4)’s activities be for social welfare.
See ABA Section of Taxation, Comments of the Individual Members of the Exempt
Organizations Committee’s Task Force on Section 501(c)(4) and Politics, 45 EXEMPT ORG. TAX
REV. 136 (2004). However, the views of some of the principal authors of this Task Force have,
in the wake of Citizens United, changed. See 2014 ABA Comments, at 11 n.15.
281

See 2014 ABA Comments, supra note 280, at 11. This interpretation would afford clients
maximal leeway for campaign activity.
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Although the IRS has appeared at times to acquiesce in the equation of primarily with
51%,282 such statements have been in non-precedential materials.283 At the same time, the agency
has consistently taken the position in litigation that 501(c)(4) groups cannot have a non-social
welfare purpose that is more than “insubstantial,” and numerous courts, including appellate
courts in five federal Circuits, have agreed.284 The statement by the Tax Court in Ocean Pines
Association v. Commissioner is illustrative. In upholding the IRS’s denial of a 501(c)(4)
exemption, the court stated that an organization “will not be denied exemption if it partakes in
activities not in furtherance of an exempt purpose so long as such nonconforming activities are

282

See Jennifer Mueller, Defending Nuance in an Era of Tea Party Politics: Any Argument for
the Continued Use of Standards to Evaluate the Campaign Activities of 501(c)(4) Organizations,
22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 103, 111 (2014); Judy Kindell on §501(c)(4)-(6) Organizations and §
527, 11 Paul Streckfus’ EO Tax J. 42, 44 (May/June 2006) (stating the opinion of a tax law
specialist in the Exempt Organization Division of the IRS). Until 1959, the regulations mirrored
the language of the underlying statute by requiring a social welfare group to be engaged
exclusively in social welfare activities. See Miriam Galston, Vision Services Plan v. U.S.:
Implications for Campaign Activities of 501(c)(4)s, 53 EXEMPT ORG. TAX. REV. 165, 166 (2006).
For the discussions within the IRS about the regulation’s inconsistency with the statute, see id. at
168-69.
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On non-precedential materials, see Elizabeth Kingsley & John Pomeranz, A Crash at the
Crossroads: Tax and Campaign Finance Laws Colllide in Regulation of Political Activities of
Tax-Exempt Organizations, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 55, 62-63 (2004). The IRS has also
stated in internal documents that 501(c)(4) organizations can have a greater amount of nonexempt activity than can 501(c)(3) groups. See Galston, supra note 282, 167-68.
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See Ocean Pines Ass’n v. Comm’r, 135 T.C. 276, 281 (2010), aff’d 672 F.3d 284 (4th Cir. 2012);
Vision Services Plan v. U.S., 2006-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,173, at 11 (E.D. Cal. 2005), aff’d
2008-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,160,101 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1097 (2009); Am.
Ass’n of Christian Schools Voluntary Employees Beneficiary Ass'n Welfare Plan Trust v. United
States, 850 F.2d 1510, 1515-16 (11th Cir. 1988); Police Benevolent Ass'n of Richmond, Va.. v.
United States, 661 F. Supp. 765, 773 (E.D. Va.1987), aff'd without opinion, 836 F.2d 547 (4th
Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (unpublished opinion); Mutual Aid Association of the Church of the
Brethren v. United States, 759 F.2d 792, 796 (10th Cir. 1985); Contracting Plumbers
Cooperative Restoration Corp. v. U.S., 488 F.2d 684, 686 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
827 (1974); American Women Buyers Club, Inc. v. United States, 338 F.2d 526, 528 (2d Cir.
1964); People's Educational Camp Soc'y, Inc. v. Comm'r, 331 F.2d 923, 931 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 839 (1964).
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insubstantial in comparison to activities which further exempt purpose(s).”285
Clearly, if a 501(c)(4)’s non-social welfare purpose is limited to being insubstantial, an
organization’s non-exempt activities cannot be 40%, much less 49%, of its overall activities.286
Further, even if the relevant factors measured were limited to an organization’s expenditures, it is
not obvious whether substantial/insubstantial should refer to a percentage or an absolute dollar
amount. Recall that several cases examining the FECA primary purpose standard criticized a
percentage test because it could cause a low-budget group spending $1,500 on candidate
advertisements to be a political committee, while a high-budget group might not be a political
committee even if it spent $1.5 million on such advertisements.287 If the relevant factors
measured extend beyond expenditures–e.g., including time spent, volunteer hours, or
representations in solicitations or other communications with potential donors or the public–the
primarily test would be even more elusive. Whatever test the IRS eventually adopts, it should
elaborate the standard in considerable detail, as it has in the case of lobbying,288 to enable
affected groups to plan their political involvement so as not to threaten their exempt status.
Moreover, a group’s political activities will be combined with all its other non-exempt activities
to determine if the group is operating primarily to promote social welfare.
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Ocean Pines Ass’n, 135 T.C. at 281.
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Although the statute and regulations don’t speak of a social welfare or exempt purpose, the
regulations imply this by saying that an “organization embraced within this section is one which
is operated primarily for the purpose of bringing about civic betterments and social
improvements.” Treas. reg. §1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i).
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See supra notes 112-119 and accompanying text.
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See 26 C.F.R. §§53.4911-2, 53.4945-2.
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In an earlier article, I elaborated what the primarily standard should be.289 To summarize,
since the statute requires 501(c)(4) groups to be exclusively engaged in promoting social welfare,
the interpretation of primarily should be heavily influenced by the statutory mandate. There are
administrative reasons to permit 501(c)(4) groups to engage to some degree in campaign
activities, since the ambiguity surrounding what constitutes political campaign activity makes a
zero tolerance standard impractical. Not only does the statutory language suggest that
“primarily” permits only a modest amount of non-exempt activity. The underlying rationale for
having a 501(c)(4) exemption in the first place suggests that only an insubstantial amount of nonexempt activity should be permitted. A fundamental principle of the IRC is that all income is
subject to tax unless otherwise excepted.290 In section 501(a) Congress excepted from income
taxation numerous categories of entity because of specific types of public good they provide.
The public good provided by social welfare organizations is elaborated as “the common good
and general welfare of the people of the community” and “bringing about civic betterments and
social improvements.”291 While these phrases are maddeningly indeterminate, they do exclude
certain types of enterprises. As noted earlier, the regulations state that social welfare does not
include participation in political campaigns for or against a candidate for public office, social or
recreational activities, and commercial activities.292 Further, the terms of the regulation exclude
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See Galston, supra note 282.
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See 26 U.S.C. §61 (defining gross income as “all income from whatever source derived”).
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11 C.F.R. §1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i).
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11 C.F.R. §1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii).
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private benefit or private goods.293 In American Campaign Academy v. Commissioner,294 the Tax
Court expressly stated that conferring a benefit on a political party constitutes a private benefit.
In short, both because the regulations exclude political campaign activity from the purview of
social welfare and because political participation represents a private benefit, the campaign
activity of 501(c)(4) organizations should not be substantial. That this interpretation accords
with congressional intent can also be seen from Congress’s assertion, in enacting section 527,
that this new form of tax exempt entity would take “the campaign-type activities ... entirely out
of the section 501(c) organization ... to the benefit both of the organization and the administration
of the tax laws.”295
C. The Meaning of “Political” for 501(c)(4) Purposes
Although the 501(c)(4) regulations specify that social welfare does not include
participation in a political campaign for or against a candidate for elected office, the regulations
do not explain what political activity296 is covered by this statement. Over the years, the IRS has
issued precedential and non-precedential forms of guidance that clarify the meaning of political
activity for organizations described in 501(c), and there are a few judicial decisions on the same
topic. Only one precedential ruling identifies political activity specifically in the context of
501(c)(4); most rulings elaborate the term in connection with 501(c)(3) organizations. The
293

See Rev. Rul. 73-306, 1973-2 Cum.Bull. 179; 80-206, 1980-2 Cum.Bull. 185.
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See 92 T.C.1053 (1989).
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S. REP. NO. 93-1357, at 30 (1974).
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The 501(c)(4) regulations say “direct or indirect participation or intervention in political
campaigns on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public office.” 26 C.F.R.
§1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii). The title of that subsection is “Political or social activities.” Id. This
article uses “political activity,” “political campaign activity,” and “participation in political
campaigns” interchangeably.
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501(c)(4) ruling involved a group that rated candidates for public office as its main activity. The
ratings were made on a nonpartisan basis and were explained in terms of the candidates’
qualifications, e.g., education and experience. Although the group “was formed for the purpose
of promoting an enlightened electorate,” the ruling held that it was not entitled to 501(c)(4)
exemption because its primary activity, even if nonpartisan, constituted “participation or
intervention on behalf of those candidates favorably rated and in opposition to those less
favorably rated.”297 The Second Circuit upheld the identical position for a 501(c)(3) entity that
rated candidates for elected judicial positions, even though the entity frequently gave multiple
candidates a “highly qualified” rating.298
There are, however, additional IRS rulings and other materials that can be consulted. The
IRS has indicated that rulings elaborating the meaning of political activity for purposes of
501(c)(3) groups also apply to 501(c)(4) organizations.299 In addition, IRS materials that
elaborate the meaning of political activity for section 527 organizations are also useful for
elaborating its meaning for social welfare and other tax-exempt 501(c) groups.300
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Rev. Rul. 67-368, 1967-2 Cum.Bull. 194. See Priv. Letter Rul. 202022009, 2020 PLR Lexis
153 (Feb. 20, 2020).
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See Ass’n of the Bar of City of New York v. Comm’r, 858 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1030 (1989).
299

See Rev. Rul. 81-95, 1981-1 Cum.Bull. 332.

300

This is because 501(c) organizations are potentially subject to tax on the amounts they spend
on political activities, IRC §527(f), and the definition of political activity for the purpose of this
tax is almost the same as for section 527 groups. See IRC §527(e)(2). A few activities that are
political activities for a 527 group would not be for 501(c)s. See 2003 EO CPE TEXT, supra note
271, at L-9 to L-10. However, under section 527(f)(1), a 501(c) organization engaging in such
activities is only taxable on the lesser of its political expenditures or its net investment income in
the taxable year. Thus, a social welfare organization could spend millions of dollars on political
activity (assuming this is not its primary activity) and still be liable for no or minimal tax if it has
little or no net investment income. See Rev. Rul. 2004-6, 2004-1 Cum.Bull. 328.
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The scope of the concept of political activity for federal election law purposes is not the
same as its scope for federal income tax purposes, and in most respects, the concept is much
broader under the IRC.301 A major difference is that the election law standard encompasses only
activities associated with campaigns for federal office, while the tax code standard can reach
political activity at the local, state, or federal level. As a consequence, all independent
expenditures for FECA purposes will be political campaign activity for purposes of section
501(c)(4) as well, but so will express advocacy at any other level of government. Electioneering
activities for FECA purposes include only certain communications made on the eve of a federal
primary or election,302 while the tax code concept could reach comparable communications made
at any point in an election cycle and at any level of government.303 The two regimes also differ in
that ads classified as electioneering communications under federal campaign finance law might
be considered a form of issue advocacy by the IRS, depending upon the context and, thus, could
count as social welfare rather than as political.304
The main respects in which the tax code and election law standards differ concern
301

See Miriam Galston, When Statutory Regimes Collide: Will Citizens United and Wisconsin
Right to Life Make Federal Tax Regulation of Campaign Activity Unconstitutional?, 13 U. PA. J
OF CONST. L. 867, 877-79 (2011) (comparing the type of activity treated as political in the
election law and tax regimes). See also Judith E. Kindell & John Francis Reilly, Election Year
Issues, EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL
INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 2002 (2002 IRS CPE TEXT) 343-344 (explaining the
IRS cannot adopt the FEC standard because of the different objectives of the two regimes),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopici02.pdf.
302

See supra note 13. Although “electioneering communication” was narrowed to the functional
equivalent of express advocacy for some purposes, the original definition still applies for
disclosure. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 368-69.
303

Although communications made outside the 30/60 day framework of FECA can be political
activity for exempt organizations, the more distant an election involving the candidate named is,
the less likely the communication will be viewed as political activity by the IRS.
304

See Rev. Rul. 2004-6, 2004-1 Cum.Bull. 331; Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 Cum.Bull. 1421.
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activities that support or oppose a candidate for elected office, but are not express advocacy or
electioneering communications. There are only a few instances in which the support/oppose
standard applies in the election law context,305 whereas this standard underlies many of the
activities deemed campaign activities for IRC purposes. In a series of revenue rulings spanning
more than 40 years, the IRS has attempted, largely through illustrative examples, to identify the
categories of activities that will be counted as participation in a political campaign.306 Most of
these examples portray a series of factors that do or do not suggest the intent to affect a political
campaign, and the IRS reaches its ultimate assessment by applying a balancing process called the
“facts and circumstances test.”
Most of the examples included in IRS guidance involve attempts to influence the
outcome of an individual candidate’s campaign for public office.307 These can involve obviously
political campaign activities, such as distributing partisan voter guides, raising money for a
candidate, disseminating a candidate’s campaign literature, or providing a forum for only one of
two competing candidates for a public office.308 The examples also include less blatant forms of
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See 52 U.S.C. §30101(20)(A)(iii).
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The most comprehensive collection of examples is in Rev. Rul. 2007-41, supra note 304,
which discusses situations that could be political activity that is completely prohibited for
501(c)(3) organizations. Rev. Rul. 2004-6, supra note 304, lists factors the IRS considers to
determine if an activity is a non-taxable exempt function for a section 527 political organization,
which would make it a potentially taxable activity if done by a 501(c)(4) group.
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See 2002 IRS CPE TEXT, supra note 301, at 339-341 (discussing the meaning of “candidate”
and “public office” for IRC and FECA purposes); Rev. Rul. 67-71, 1967-1 Cum. Bull. 125
(stating that an elective school board position is a public office).
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See Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 Cum.Bull. 154; Rev. Rul. 80-282, 1980-2 Cum.Bull. 178; 2002
IRS CPE TEXT, supra note 298, at 419; Rev. Rul. 74-574, 1974-2 C.B. 160. See also Erika
Lunder, IRS Guidelines for Political Advocacy by Exempt 501(c) Organizations:
Revenue Ruling 2004-6, CRS REPORT (Jan. 10, 2005).
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political campaign activity. For example, inviting all candidates for a particular office to speak
during the month preceding an election, but scheduling the preferred candidate at the time likely
to attract the largest audience, will constitute campaign activity by the organization,309 as will
express advocacy by an organization’s leader in a context where her statement can be attributed
to the organization.310 A statement advocating a position on a public issue may be classified as
political campaign activity if it occurs in proximity to an election, names or otherwise identifies a
candidate in the election, connects the candidate to the organization’s approved (or disapproved)
position, or otherwise indicates an intent to influence the candidate’s success in the election.311
In short, what constitutes political activity for a social welfare group is clear in some
instances and ambiguous in others. The 2004 and 2007 revenue rulings described in the
preceding clarified the situation somewhat, but the IRS’s subsequent attempt to further clarify the
meaning of political activity for 501(c)(4) and other exempt organizations was unsuccessful.312
In response to this situation, a group of nonprofit and tax attorneys founded The Bright Lines
Project, an effort to develop a series of precise and detailed definitions and rules to eliminate
much of the ambiguity surrounding the meaning of political activity for exempt organizations
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See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, supra note 304, at 1423 (introduction to situations 7-9).
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See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, supra note 304, at 1423 (situation 6).
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See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, supra note 304, at 1424-1425. Another factor listed by the IRS is
“[w]hether the timing of the communication and identification of the candidate are related to a
non-electoral event like a scheduled vote on specific legislation by an officeholder who also is a
candidate for public office.” Id. at 1424. Also important is whether the subject matter is a wedge
issue between the opponents in the election. Id. See 2002 IRS CPE Text, supra note 301, at 344346.
312

See infra notes 316-320 and accompanying text.
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described in sections 501(c)(4), (5), and (6).313 The proposals elicited both praise and
criticism,314 but for reasons explained in what follows, neither these proposals nor any other
clarifications of the political activity standard for tax-exempt organizations have been adopted by
the IRS to date.
The IRS has occasionally attempted to deny or revoke 501(c)(4) exemption to partisan
organizations because they provide too much private benefit to qualify as social welfare
organizations. Employing a private benefit test enables the agency to avoid determinations based
upon the participation or intervention in campaign activity standard. To date, however, it seems
to have been successful in utilizing the private benefit theory with 501(c)(3) groups, but not
501(c)(4) organizations.315
D. IRS Enforcement
1. IRS attempts at clarifying “Political Campaign Activity” and “Primarily”
The IRS has made attempts intermittently over the years to enforce limits on politically
active social welfare organizations. The most important of these efforts was its decision in 2013
to initiate a rulemaking that would clarify the meaning of political campaign activity for
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Public Citizen, The Bright Lines Project (summarizing the history and rationale of the project
and containing the conclusions of the group, which were sent to the IRS in November of 2014),
https://brightlinesproject.org/about-us/.
314

See Ellen P. Aprill, A Case Study of Legislation vs. Regulation: Defining Political Campaign
Intervention under Federal Tax Law, 63 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1639-47 (2014) and sources cited.
315

See American Campaign Academy, supra note 263 (describing partisan 501(c)(3) private
benefit case); Ohio DLC, Inc. v. IRS, T.C. No. 9743-00 (2001) (entering a stipulated decision
that revoking the 501(c)(4) DLC’s exemption due to private benefit was erroneous). See also
Democratic Leadership Council v. U.S., 542 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2008) (rejecting IRS
revocation of 501(c)(4) exemption because was retroactive).
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501(c)(4) purposes and the contours of the primarily standard.316
The IRS’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) elicited more than 150,000
comments and was criticized by both the political right and the political left.317 As the IRS noted,
the proposed “more definitive” rules would sometimes capture more and sometimes less than
existing interpretations.318 Although its proposed regulations would thus be less lenient than
existing law in certain areas, it would be more lenient in others--a necessary byproduct of
creating relatively precise and objective rules to replace the amorphous, repeatedly criticized
“facts and circumstances” standard.319 Even though greater certainty about the parameters of
political activity would assist nonprofits and their tax counselors as well as the IRS in navigating
an otherwise ambiguous and contested area of law, the criticism of its proposed regulations was
intense and wide-ranging.320 The Service failed to move forward on these regulations,321 and
316

See IRS, Guidance for Tax-Exempt Social Welfare Organizations on Candidate-Related
Political Activities, 78 Fed. Reg. 71535 (Nov. 29, 2013) (NPRM).
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See IRS News Release, Prepared Remarks of Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service John
Koskinen before the National Press Club (Apr. 2, 2014),
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/prepared-remarks-of-commissioner-of-internal-revenue-service-j
ohn-koskinen-before-the-national-press-club-2014. See also Matt Nese & Kelsey Drapkin,
Overwhelmingly Opposed: An Analysis of Public and 955 Organization, Expert, and Public
Official Comments on the IRS’s 501(c)(4) Rulemaking, INSTITUTE FOR FREE SPEECH (July 21,
2014) (finding, based upon a sample of 955 comments, that 87% were opposed to the NPRM),
https://www.ifs.org/research/overwhelmingly-opposed-an-analysis-of-public-and-955organization-expert-and-public-official-comments-on-the-irss-501c4-rulemaking/.
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See NPRM, 78 Fed. Reg. at 71536-71537.
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See Donald B. Tobin, Political Campaigning by Churches and Charities: Hazardous for
501(c)(3)s, Dangerous for Democracy, 95 GEO. L. J. 1313, 1350, 1357 (2007); Kay Guinane,
Wanted: A Bright-Line Test Defining Prohibited Intervention in Elections by 501(c)(3)
Organizations, 6 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 142 (2007) (describing history and application of factsand-circumstances test and arguing for a bright-line rule); Amelia Elaqua, Eyes Wide Shut: The
Ambiguous “Political Activity” Prohibition and Its Effects on 501(c)(3) Organizations, 8 HOUS.
BUS. & TAX L.J. 113, 131-32 (2007).
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See Rick Cohen, 143,764 Comments Submitted to IRS on Proposed 501(c)(4) Regulations,
NONPROFIT Q. (Mar. 11, 2014) (noting that “[f]rom the left, right, center, and those of no politics
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since 2015, Congress has repeatedly passed legislation prohibiting the IRS from using any funds
to issue, revise, or finalize any regulation, revenue ruling, or other guidance not
limited to a particular taxpayer relating to the standard which is used to
determine whether an organization is operated exclusively for the promotion of
social welfare for purposes of section 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986, (including the proposed regulations published at 78 Fed. Reg. 71535
(November 29, 2013)).322
In short, the IRS is now actually prohibited by law from clarifying the standards
governing politically active social welfare organizations. The result is to preserve the ambiguity
about how much and what kind of political activity social welfare organizations can engage in
while retaining their exempt status. The ensuing uncertainty, in turn, has enabled a subset of
such groups to serve as repositories for unlimited amounts of dark money to flood political
campaigns without any public accountability. Among other things, this uncertainty has enabled
some groups to claim they primarily promote social welfare even when 49% of their activities
involve participating in political campaigns.
2. Other IRS enforcement
The IRS had little success in another enforcement effort potentially impacting politically
active 501(c)(4) groups. In 2011, the IRS attempted to enforce the gift tax against certain donors,

at all, the proposed regulations were thoroughly bludgeoned in most of the comments”).
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See IRS Update on the Proposed New Regulations on 501(c)(4) Organizations (May 22,
2014) (delaying a public hearing on the proposed regulations to enable the agency to review the
comments and revise the proposed regulations based upon them), https://www.irs.gov/
newsroom/irs-update-on-the-proposed-new-regulation-on-501c4-organizations. See also Press
Release, Hatch Calls for IRS to Throw Out Proposed Rule Regulating Political Activity,Agency
Seeking to Broaden Rule Governing Tax-Exempt Organizations (Apr. 13, 2015).
322

See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. Law 114-113, 129 Stat. 2433 (Dec. 18,
2015); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, Pub. Law 115-31, 131 Stat. 336 (May 5, 2017);
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. Law 115-141, 132 Stat. 535 (Mar. 23, 2018), §125;
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2019, Pub. Law 116-6 (Feb 15, 2019), §124.
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including five contributors to 501(c)(4) groups.323 The gift tax provision is imposed on
individuals who give to a single beneficiary an amount that exceeds the annual gift tax exclusion,
currently $15,000.324 Enforcement of the tax would have affected only those contributing more
than the annual gift tax exclusion to a 501(c)(4) in a given year. The pressure brought to bear on
Congress to reverse the IRS’s enforcement initiative was strong enough that members of the
Senate Finance Committee wrote a letter to the Commissioner questioning the IRS’s motives and
requesting the identities of those who made the decision to enforce the gift tax.325 Although the
Commissioner responded that enforcement against the five donors to 501(c)(4) groups was part
of “ongoing work that focuses broadly on gift tax non-compliance” and, thus, did not target
donors to social welfare organizations,326 the IRS ended the five audits and stated that any
possible actions of a similar kind would only be undertaken prospectively.327
323

See John R. Luckey & Erika K. Lunder, 501(c)(4)s and the Gift Tax: Legal Analysis,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (Aug. 10, 2012), https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/
20120810_R42655_50a6a6d02ebe83076ce441fbfb2b49c953950697.pdf; Caplin & Drysdale,
The Gift Tax and Contributions to Section 501(c)(4) Organizations: Less than Meets the Eye?
(June 14, 2011), http://www.capdale.com/alert-the-gift-tax-and-contributions-to-section501c4-organizations-less-than-meets-the-eye#Link1; Matthew Melone, Gift Taxes on Donations
to Social Welfare Organizations: De-Politicizing Social Welfare Organizations Or Politicizing
the IRS?, 12 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 51 (2013).
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See 26 U.S.C. §§2501-2503. There is a lifetime gift tax exclusion, which was more than
$11,000,000 in 2019. See 26 U.S.C. §2503. Since amount of gifts above the annual exclusion
can be credited against the lifetime exclusion, it is possible that no gift tax will be paid in the
year the annual exclusion is exceeded, although IRS Form 709 must be filed specifying the
amount of the gift. See https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/about-form-709.
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See Amanda Becker, Senate Finance Republicans Question IRS Enforcement, ROLL CALL
(May 18, 2011),
https://www.rollcall.com/2011/05/18/senate-finance-republicans-question-irs-enforcement.
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See Letter from IRS Commissioner Douglas H. Shulman to Senator John Thune (May 31,
2011), http://www.capdale.com/files/Shulman%20Letter%20May%2021,%202011.pdf. In
September of 2010, the Senate Finance Chair had written to the Commissioner asking him to
begin investigating politically active exempt organizations. Id.
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See Luckey & Lunder, supra note 323, at 1.
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In 2015, Congress passed legislation that expressly abolished the gift tax for contributions
to 501(c)(4) organizations and other tax-exempt groups.328 Thus, this potential avenue for
making politically active 501(c)(4) organizations less attractive for outsize contributions was
eliminated. In short, as was the case with the proposed regulations to clarify the meaning of the
primarily standard and the type of political activity to be measured, the issue of a gift tax
exemption for large gifts to 501(c)(4) groups is no longer in the control of the IRS.329
The IRS nonetheless has the ability to audit politically active exempt organizations to
determine whether they engage in sufficient campaign activity to warrant reclassifying them as
political organizations under section 527 or to deny them exempt status under 501(c)(4). The
IRS infrequently avails itself of this power. In one famous instance, when several hundred
groups applied to become social welfare organizations in the wake of Citizens United, the IRS
was accused of targeting conservative groups when it scrutinized applications for exemption
based upon “words such as “Tea Party” and “Patriot” (and words such as “Occupy” and
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See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. Law No. 114-113, 129 Stat. 2242 (Dec. 18,
2015), §408 (ending gift tax for 501(c)(4)-(6) groups).
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In 2018, the IRS stopped requiring 501(c)(4) and other tax-exempt organizations to identify
donors contributing $5,000 or more on their Form 990, although the information could be
required to be disclosed to the IRS upon request. See I.R.S. Revenue Procedure 2018-38, 201831 I.R.B. 280. Donors names, amounts donated, and donation date had been required, although
none of this information was available to the public. See, e.g., Schedule of Contributors 2015,
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/f990ezb--2015.pdf. In May 2020, the agency released final
regulations eliminating the need for such information on Form 990, saying that the information
was unnecessary “for the efficient administration of the internal revenue laws” and burdened the
IRS with the responsibility to redact this information when making Form 990 available for public
scrutiny. See IRS, Final regulation, 85 Fed. Reg. 31959 (May 28, 2020). See also IRS, Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, Guidance under Section 6033 Regarding the Reporting Requirements of
Exempt Organizations, 84 Fed. Reg. 47447 (Sept. 10, 2019); IRS, Proposed rule; notice of
hearing, 84 Fed. Reg. 70089 (Dec. 20, 2019).
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“Progressive”) to identify groups that were likely to be politically active.”330 Although the IRS
was ultimately cleared of the charges leveled against it,331 the controversy has lingered and
motivated legislative measures to circumscribe the IRS’s discretion in various ways.332
It is impossible to know how often the IRS denies 501(c)(4) exemption to politically
active groups or revokes an exemption already granted because of political activity. A few IRS
enforcement successes have become public. Freedom Path is an organization that held itself out
as a 501(c)(4) group since 2011.333 In 2013, the IRS officially rejected Freedom Path’s
application for exemption on the grounds that its activities were not primarily for social welfare,
and the group sued the IRS, challenging the constitutionality of the standard used to determine
which activities promote social welfare.334 In 2017, the district court granted summary judgment
to the IRS, upholding the constitutionality of the standard in question, but the Fifth Circuit
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Lily Kahng, The IRS Tea Party Controversy and Administrative Discretion, 99 CORNELL
LAW REVIEW ONLINE 41, 49 (2013),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2305851&download=yes.
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For a concise history, see Staff of S. Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, Comm. on
Homeland Sec. & Gov't Affairs, 113th Cong., IRS and TIGTA Management Failures Related to
501(c)(4) Applicants Engaged in Campaign Activity 1-7 (Comm. Print 2014) (TIGTA Report).
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See Taxpayer Knowledge of IRS Investigations Act, H.R. 1026 (Feb. 24, 2015); Penina
Lieber, The IRS in Freefall: The Scandal over Delayed Approvals of Certain Social Welfare and
Charitable Institutions, 89 PA BAR ASSN. Q. 1 (2018); Michael Wyland, Whatever Happened to
the IRS Tax Exemption Scandal?, NONPROFIT Q. (Aug. 22, 2017),
https://nonprofitquarterly.org/whatever-happened-irs-tax-exemption-scandal/.
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See Freedom Path and Free Speech: New 501(c)(4) Challenge to Constitutionality of IRS’s
Speech-Related Regulations (May 9, 2014), https://wagenmakerlaw.com/blog/freedom
-path-and-free-speech-new-501c4-challenge-constitutionality-irs%E2%80%99s-speech-related.
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Freedom Path, Inc. v. IRS, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104970 (ND Tex. 2017),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 913 F.3d 503 (5th Cir. 2019) (concluding the plaintiff
does not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of Rev. Rul. 2004-6 because a facial
challenge “considers only the text of the statute itself, and not its application to the particular
circumstances of the individual.”).
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vacated the decision because the plaintiff lacked standing to bring a facial challenge.335 As a
result, the denial by the IRS of the organization’s 501(c)(4) status is controlling.
In another high profile case, Arkansans for Common Sense claimed it spent more than
half of its 2010 $1.29 million budget on its “general purpose of educating the public” about
public issues while somewhat less than half was spent on political activities to re-elect a senator,
i.e., independent expenditures and contributions to other campaign vehicles.336 In rejecting the
group’s application for 501(c)(4) status, the IRS found that roughly 85 percent of the group’s
spending was in fact political because it occurred on the eve of the primary and general
elections.337 Accordingly, the agency concluded that the group was not primarily engaged in
promoting social welfare during 2010.
However, to judge by the number of high profile 501(c)(4) groups apparently in good
standing that are prominent in funding political advertising during campaigns,338 it appears that
either the IRS has not recently been attempting to enforce tax law rules against politically active
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See supra note 334. See also Freedom Path Revisited: Crashing on the Shoals of Standing,
https://wagenmakerlaw.com/blog/freedom-path-revisited.
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See Dark Money Stories, Arkansans for Common Sense, PROPUBLICA,
https://projects.propublica.org/dark-money/organizations/arkansans-for-common-sense.html;
Michael Beckel, IRS Says Liberal Group Too Political for ‘Social Welfare” Status, THE CTR.
FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY (June 19, 2014; Dec. 19, 2015),
https://publicintegrity.org/politics/irs-says-liberal-group-too-political-for-social-welfare-status.
See also FEC Form 5, https://docquery.fec.gov/cgi-bin/forms/C90011222/479120/; Dark Money
Illuminated, ISSUEONE.ORG 11 (Sept. 2018),
https://www.issueone.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Dark-Money-Illuminated-Report.pdf.
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See Beckel, supra note 336.

338

See Top Election Spenders, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/dark-money/top-election-spenders.
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501(c)(4) organizations339 or that it has been unsuccessful in efforts to do so.340
If it is failing to scrutinize groups that appear to be more politically active than tax law
warrants, part of the reason could be lack of resources.341 As a result of funding cuts of more
than $2 billion since 2010,342 the IRS had roughly 14,000 fewer enforcement staff as of 2018,
even though it was attempting to enforce a new tax law.343 That translated into a 30% reduction
in staff to carry out the agency’s enforcement function.344 In addition to resource issues,
however, the IRS has failed to adopt practices to utilize publicly available data about exempt
organizations’ political activity such as are maintained by the FEC and easily accessible.345
Finally, the IRS’s seeming inaction may be explained in part by the fact that the individuals who
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would be directly affected by reining in exempt organizations’ political activity are members of
Congress, who are responsible for appropriating funds for the operation of the agency, and the
President, who has the ability to interfere with the groups’ operations indirectly. In the words of
one former IRS director of legislative affairs, “[i]n Congress, the liberals will jump up and down
if IRS officials don’t go after right-wing groups, and the right will come after them if they think
they’re picking on their friends.”346 Given Congress’s recent record, e.g., reducing the IRS’s
operating budget and passing a law forbidding the IRS from clarifying the rules governing
political activity of exempt organizations, it would not be unreasonable if IRS personnel avoid
activities that could inspire retaliation by members of Congress.
In sum, a combination of inaction by IRS personnel and Congressional obstruction has
led to a situation where portions of the IRC intended to create tax incentives to further social
welfare and other public goods are now routinely abused to create campaign funding vehicles
that attract vast sums of money from unidentified sources. Despite the obstacles created by
Congress, the IRS still retains the authority to enforce the laws on the books against 501(c)(4)
groups and other entities abusing the tax code for their private, partisan purposes. Its task will be
easier if Congress stops tying its hands by reducing its budget and interfering with its ability to
publish guidance to clarify the boundaries of acceptable campaign activity by exempt
organizations. Nonetheless, until that time, the IRS has tools at its disposal to enforce the current
limits on campaigning by exempt organizations.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Campaign spending by outside groups has skyrocketed in the last decade. In an
increasing number of races, outside groups spend more money than the candidates themselves.
Rules permitting unlimited contributions to certain outside groups have enabled a small number
of high-wealth individuals and corporations to have a disproportionate impact on elections.
Social scientists have documented connections between these developments and the growth of
polarization, the increase in negative advertising, and the decline of the moderating influences of
parties. No single reform can reverse all the adverse consequences of outside money.
Nonetheless numerous steps can be taken immediately based upon existing law that would curb
some of the worst excesses of current campaign finance practices.
First and foremost, many exempt organizations should be classified as political
committees and, thus, regulated by the FEC under FECA. If they were properly classified, they
would be subject to contribution limits and disclosure requirements. They would thus cease to
serve as funnels for unlimited and unaccountable sums of money flooding elections.
Second, the IRS contributes to unlimited and unaccountable spending by not policing its
own rules, namely, that (c)(4)s and trade associations primarily serve a public interest, not a
partisan one. The tools it needs are already at its disposal. What the IRS lacks is the will, not the
way, to pursue its proper mission and counteract the threat posed by the trajectory of outside
spending to the integrity of elections in America.
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